Pak can’t win war against India: PM
Counters Sharif’s remark that Kashmir is a flashpoint between the two countries
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, December 4
Kashmir and its entrenched history of dispute today led to yet another war of words between New Delhi and Islamabad with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh saying there was no scope of Pakistan winning a war against India in his lifetime.
Manmohan Singh was reacting to a statement of his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif who was quoted by Pakistani newspaper, The Dawn, as saying: “Kashmir is a flash point and it can trigger a fourth war with India.”
According to the paper, Sharif made these remarks during a trip to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir where he addressed the budget session of the council.
"There is no scope of Pakistan winning any such war in my lifetime," the Prime Minister said during a brief interaction with reporters at a Navy Day function in
Sharif's office was quick to rubbish the report in The Dawn as ”baseless and incorrect.” “He (Sharif) never uttered these words in his address to the Pak-occupied Kashmir Council,” it said in a statement, adding that Sharif was of the opinion that any issue of conflict between Pakistan and India has to be resolved through peaceful means.
The statement had, however, quoted Sharif as saying that the Kashmir issue should be settled according to the aspirations of the people and the UN resolutions as peace in the region was not possible without it. "The Prime Minister said he had a dream of seeing held-Kashmir free from the Indian occupation and desired that this dream could turn into reality during his lifetime," the statement said. Sharif, however, expressed his satisfaction over the improvement of situation on the Line of Control (LoC).
In New Delhi, the PM’s words come just a day before the winter session of Parliament. The principle Opposition party, the BJP, has been blaming the Congress-led UPA government for going soft on Pakistan.
Manmohan Singh and Sharif had met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September.
They had agreed to a series of initiatives, including talks between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs), between the two sides to defuse LoC tension.
No possibility of war with Pak: Farooq
Union Minister Farooq Abdullah on Wednesday dismissed Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s remark that the Kashmir issue could trigger a fourth war between the two countries. “He (Sharif) has to manage his government. He has to talk in this way to keep his people with him. I think there is no possibility of a fourth war,” said Abdullah.
Withdraw troops from Siachen: Pak to India
Pakistan on Wednesday asked India to withdraw its troops from Siachen, claiming their presence was damaging the environment and polluting one of the country's main sources of water supplies."Pakistan is facing a water shortage and Indian troops are damaging the virgin snow of Siachen," said Sartaj Aziz, Adviser to the Prime Minister.
Cabinet panel to decide on COSC chief
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, December 4
The Cabinet Committee on Security will take a call on deciding the terms for having a permanent Chairman of the Chief’s of Staff Committee (COSC)-a body of three service chiefs.
Having a full-time Chairman for the COSC was one of the items suggested by the Naresh Chandra task force. Besides this, the entire list of suggestions of the task force has been forwarded to the CCS for a decision, top sources have confirmed. Yesterday, Navy Chief Admiral DK Joshi had confirmed that the three services were in agreement on having an officer heading the COSC on full-time basis. At present, the senior most service chief is the ex officio Chairman of the COSC. Defence Minister AK Antony has yet again asked all political parties to give their opinion on having a full-time Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), as recommended by the Kargil review committee in 2001.
89 Armoured Regiment presented with Standards
The Army’s 89 Armoured Regiment, having close operational association with the western region, was presented the Standards by Chief of the Army Staff General Bikram Singh at Namkum military station near Ranchi last week.
The Standards is a mark of recognition of a military establishment’s professionalism, dedication and service to the nation, and is traditionally presented by the President at a special ceremonial parade.
The regiment was raised in 1980 and has since fought insurgency in Punjab as well as Jammu and Kashmir, besides taking part in Operation Vijay, Operation Parakram and Operation Varuna.
Two of its former commandants have risen to the rank of Lieutenant General and incidentally, both have served under the Chandimandir-based Western Command — Lt General Anil Chait, presently Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff, had commanded 2 Corps at Ambala while Lt General Anil Bhalla, presently Director General Perspective Planning, had commanded 9 Corps at Yol near Dharamshala. The regiment is presently under the command of Col Jagat Singh.
Ties with Lanka vital
Navy Chief Admiral DK Joshi was candid enough at his press conference on December 3 when he narrated the military importance of continuing to work with Sri Lanka even as political opposition from Tamil Nadu was peaking.
The Admiral said there was no scaling up of activity with Sri Lanka. “With Lanka, we have training-related interaction and depending upon the needs of that country, we train their personnel accordingly. The arrangement is reviewed periodically. We need to maintain good relations,” the Admiral said.
When asked why it was important for India, the Navy Chief, without naming China or Pakistan, explained that it was to our advantage that they ask us. Otherwise, they could go elsewhere, he said.
This comes just weeks after Tamil Nadu-based parties and state politicians of the Congress and the BJP forced Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to back off from attending the CHOGM at Colombo.
Para raid in Sind
December has special significance for 10 Para, an elite Special Forces battalion. It was in the first week of this month in 1971 that the unit had carried out a raid 80 km inside enemy territory on the Indus-Rangers Headquarters at Chachro in Sind and destroyed it. The battalion, known as the Desert Scorpions, was then based at near Barmer in Rajasthan and infiltrated inside Pakistan on the night of December 5.
The assault on Chachro began in the early hours of December 7. The raiding party came under fire on the outskirts of Chachro, but by daylight, the Paras had neutralised all threats and cleared the enemy from Chachro, taking 17 prisoners of war and capturing a huge cache of small arms.
The raid had been led by the unit’s then commanding officer Lt Col Bhawani Singh, a royal scion from Jaipur. He was decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra while the unit was awarded Battle Honour Chachro and Theatre Honour Sind. Each year, the battalion observes Chachro Day to commemorate the battle.
Flag Day advanced
An event which attracts little public attention is the Armed Forces Flag Day, meant to express solidarity with serving and retired soldiers. Traditionally observed on December 7 each year, this year, it has been advanced by a day due to the designated day being a holiday.
Prior to Independence, the British had a convention of observing Remembrance Day on November 11 each year. Red paper poppies were distributed to the public in return for donations and it was also referred to as the Poppy Day.
The donations were primarily meant for the welfare of British soldiers, though the Crown had the discretion for earmarking a portion for the welfare of Indian ex-servicemen. Post-Independence, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet decided in July 1948 that such donations would be for Indian soldiers only.
In August 1949, it was decided that Flag Day would be observed on December 7 and token flags and car stickers would be distributed in return for donations that would be used for welfare measures.
Sikh Regiment Colonel
Lt General GS Shergill has taken over as Colonel of the Sikh Regiment, one of the most highly decorated regiments of the Army. He is presently posted as Chief of Staff, Central Command, at Lucknow. In his capacity as the Colonel, he will be responsible for looking after the affairs of the regiment that comprises 19 regular infantry battalions and three Territorial Army battalions.
Lt General Shergill was commissioned in 1977 into 8 Sikh, the battalion that proved its mettle in the 1999 Kargil conflict and received the Battle Honour Tiger Hill. The General belongs to Chak Bilgan village in Nawanshahr.
Sub tragedy: Search still on for bodies
Tribune News Service
Mumbai, December 4
Divers of the Indian Navy have still not stopped looking for the remains of the crew of submarine INS Sindhurakshak which sank at the Mumbai port on August 14. “We have not stopped the search operation, our divers are still at the job. We are trying to find out if human remains can be found,” Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha, chief of Western Naval Command said on the occasion of Navy Day.
The Russian-made Kilo-class submarine which was back in India after a refit sank after a series of explosions off the Mumbai port. So far remains of only 11 of the 18 crew members including three officers have been recovered.
The Navy is yet to determine the cause of the mishap. Sinha said it is still not known whether the explosions were due to an accident or because of some human error.
The submarine is still on the seabed and the process to salvage the vessel is still on. The Defence Ministry has short-listed three companies to carry out the salvage operations and a decision on this would be taken shortly, Sinha said.
Naval officials had earlier said the exact cause of the explosions would be known only after the submarine is subjected to various analysis after being salvaged.
Fire breaks out on naval ship at Vizag
Visakhapatnam, December 4
A fire broke out on INS Konkan at the dry dock in Visakhapatnam on Navy Day today, but there was no loss of life. The fire incident has come a day after Navy Chief Admiral D K Joshi asserted that Navy's record was "not all that bad" in terms of accidents when compared to other navies in the world.
Navy sources said five persons suffered injuries, but there was no loss of life.
The fire was doused before it could cause any damage, defence sources said. The ship was in the dry dock for maintenance when the fire broke out this evening, they said, adding the cause of the fire was being investigated.
In recent times there have been mishaps involving naval warships. On August 14, the INS Sindhurakshak had sunk in the Mumbai naval harbour after an explosion, killing all 18 personnel on board.
Soon after that a fire took place on aircraft carrier INS Viraat off the coast of Mumbai. Defence Minister A K Antony had pulled up the Navy for the sinking of INS Sindhurakshak and asked the force not to fritter away resources of the nation.
Meanwhile, Navy divers have still not stopped looking for the remains of the crew of submarine INS Sindhurakshak which sank at the Mumbai port on August 14. “We have not stopped the search operation, our divers are still at the job,” Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha, chief of Western Naval Command said on Navy Day. — PTI
Another four-star General
Move to have a permanent Chairman, COSC
THE three service chiefs have mooted a proposal for a permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), in the rank of a four-star General which will be the equivalent to a service chief. Currently, the practice is for each of the senior-most service chief to hold the post of Chairman, COSC, on a rotational basis. The tenure of the Chairman, COSC, is hence not fixed and is dependent on the Chairman's date of retirement. As a result, the tenure could vary from a few months to over a year. There have, in fact, been occasions when a service chief has been the Chairman, COSC, for as few as four months.
The proposal for a permanent Chairman, COSC, will mean creating a fourth post of a four-star General. As such the purpose behind creating a permanent post will be to permit the Chairman, COSC, to focus exclusively on tri-service issues over a greater length of time. As of now it seems that the proposal falls short of the much-awaited Chief of Defence Staff or CDS who is meant to serve as the principal military adviser to the government. Post-Kargil war, a task force on higher defence management that formed part of the Group of Ministers Committee that examined the gamut of India's defence and intelligence, had proposed creating a CDS. While accepting the proposal in principle, the government instead confined itself to creating an Integrated Defence Staff headed by a Chief of Integrated Staff, a three-star General.
In other words, the government has so far only ended up creating a secretariat for the CDS but not the crucial post of CDS itself. In proposing a permanent Chairman COSC, the three service chiefs, it seems, are seeking to upgrade the post of the CIS to that of a four-star General. It remains to be seen whether this proposal, if approved, will result in creating a CDS through the back door and, if not, on how the chiefs of three very hierarchy and seniority conscious services will coordinate with this fourth four-star General.
Nawaz Sharif and army coups
Why Raheel Sharif was named Kayani's successor
Zulfiqar Bhutto, who never tired of boasting of how he had got the better of Indira Gandhi in Simla, appointed the obsequious Gen Zia-ul-Haq as Pakistan’s army chief superseding six serving officers. Describing this appointment as her husband's greatest mistake, Begum Nusrat Bhutto told me in 1982 that her husband had been carried away by Zia’s professions of eternal loyalty. There was even an occasion when, Quran in hand, Zia swore before Bhutto: “You are the saviour of Pakistan and we owe it to you to be totally loyal to you”. Barely a year later, on July 5, 1977, Zia ousted Bhutto in a military coup staged by the army's infamous Rawalpindi-based 111 Brigade. On April 4, 1979, Zia had the person he described as the “saviour of Pakistan” hanged, after a farcical trial.
Nawaz Sharif was a product of Zia’s military rule, enjoying a meteoric rise under the patronage of Zia’s military Governor of Punjab, Gen Ghulam Jilani Khan. It was a period when Zia was bent on destabilising India’s Punjab province. Sharif’s fondness for contacts with “Khalistanis” like the Washington-based Ganga Singh Dhillon continued even through his second term. When Benazir was voted to power in 1988, Sharif made common cause with Zia-appointed President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the army chief, Gen Aslam Beg, and ISI chief Asad Durrani. Benazir was ousted and Sharif's Muslim League was swept to power in 1991. Sharif's ISI chief, a fundamentalist member of the Tablighi Jamat, Gen Javed Nasir staged the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts with assistance from Dawood Ebrahim. Sharif was sacked shortly thereafter by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, but restored to office by the Supreme Court. When the army chief, Gen Asif Nawaz, with whom he had serious differences, died in mysterious circumstances, Sharif superseded three senior officials to appoint the soft-spoken Waheed Kakkar as the new army chief. Kakkar sent Sharif packing from office soon thereafter.
Sharif learnt nothing from this experience. He unceremoniously forced the resignation of his army chief, Gen Jehangir Karamat, after he was re-elected in 1997, only to appoint a Muhajir, Gen Parvez Musharraf, as his army chief, believing Musharraf could be kept in check. He superseded a highly rated Pashtun Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan. Believing that the nuclear tests of 1998 had given him unparalleled popularity and power and disregarding the fact that he was ruling a bankrupt country, Sharif encouraged and participated in Musharraf's Kargil misadventure. When the misadventure became a fiasco and he was forced to rush to the Clinton White House to bail him out, Sharif threw the entire blame on Musharraf for the international disgrace and disrepute his country faced following the Kargil misadventure. Growing mutual distrust and animosity between Sharif and Musharraf led to the coup of October 12, 1999, with Sharif being incarcerated and later bailed out by the Saudis.
Sharif and the army establishment share much in common. Both have a proven track record of proximity to Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban. Both have close links with Hafiz Saeed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Sharif also has close links with extremist anti-Shia groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. But Sharif is averse to ceding almost total powers to the army and playing second fiddle on national security and foreign policy issues, like President Zardari was compelled to do by an assertive General Kayani. These are the considerations that motivated Sharif in appointing Raheel Sharif as Kayani’s successor. Sharif bypassed Lt Gen Haroon Aslam, who was regarded by commentators within Pakistan as an “average officer” and kicked Kayani's protégé, Lt Gen Rashid Mahmud, up as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Gen Raheel Khan has a reasonable career profile, but is not regarded as likely to set the Indus on fire, by innovation and drive.
What clinched Raheel Sharif's appointment was evidently his close relationship with Lt Gen (retd) Abdul Qader Baloch, a Sharif confidant, who is a Minister for Tribal Affairs. If Sharif was really interested in having an army chief who would deal effectively with the threat posed by religious extremism spearheaded by Tehriq-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, most observers agree that he should have appointed Lt Gen Tariq Khan, the next in line for promotion. Khan is a Pashtun Armoured Corps officer, credited with restoring the shattered morale of the frontier constabulary after it was mauled by the TTP. It seems that Sharif still believes that he can buy peace with the TTP, which well-informed observers consider as unrealistic and dangerous. Sharif appears to fight shy of appointing Pashtun officers with distinguished family connections to the post of army chief.
As Director General of Military Training, Raheel Sharif is known to have stressed the importance of shifting attention, for the present, from an exclusively India-centric approach to focusing on internal challenges. He, however, lacks both the stature and resolve necessary for ending support for the Afghan Taliban, or for anti-India jihadi outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba. He also has a political boss who has an affinity for jihadi groups for use in both India and Afghanistan. While the Pakistan army may remain prepared to take on the TTP, it will not do so under Nawaz Sharif's leadership unless the internal security situation deteriorates significantly and destabilises Punjab province. Moreover, as the security situation deteriorates along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, there will be increasing allegations holding Afghanistan and India responsible for the activities of groups like the TTP.
The onset of winter is likely to make infiltration across the mountains of Kashmir difficult. But New Delhi should plan on the assumption that when the snow melts in June 2014, there will a resumption of infiltration and violence. The intervening months give us time to think out a strategy on how to effectively deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and bring to justice the perpetrators of 26/11. We will hopefully avoid shedding tears for Pakistan being a “victim of terrorism” as we did at Havana, and not delink dialogue from action on terrorism as we did at Sharm-el Sheikh. India's South Block mandarins are, however, not alone in being obsessed with “uninterrupted and uninterruptable” dialogue with Pakistan. The senior-most American military officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, had 26 meetings with General Kayani in the mistaken belief that he could charm Kayani into ending support for terrorism. He retired a disillusioned man, bitter with Pakistani duplicity, calling the Haqqani network a “veritable arm” of the ISI.
Mixed Legacy for Departing Pakistani Army Chief
LONDON — When he leaves his post on Friday, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the inscrutable Pakistani Army chief and former spymaster, will end a nearly decade-long chapter as the focus of American fears and frustrations in Pakistan, the reluctant partner in a contentious and often ill-tempered strategic dance.
Suspicious American officials frequently accused him, and the 600,000-member army he led, of double-dealing and bad faith: supporting the Afghan Taliban, allying with militant groups who bombed embassies and bases, and sheltering Osama bin Laden.
Those accusations were made in private, usually, but exploded into the open in late 2011 when Adm. Mike Mullen, the American military chief who sought to befriend General Kayani over golf and dinners, issued an angry tirade to Congress about Pakistani duplicity.
The taciturn General Kayani weathered those accusations with a sang-froid that left both allies and enemies guessing about what, or whom, he knew. But few doubted that he nursed grievances, too — about C.I.A. covert operations, the humiliating raid that killed Bin Laden, and perceived American arrogance and inconstancy.
General Kayani, 61, steps down with those arguments still lingering. And reckoning with his legacy exposes a cold truth at the heart of the turbulent American-Pakistani relationship: that after years of diplomatic effort, and billions of dollars in aid, the countries’ aims and methods remain fundamentally opposed — particularly when it comes to the endgame next door in Afghanistan.
“We have almost no strategic convergences with Pakistan, at any level,” admitted a senior American defense official. “You’ll never change that, and it’s naïve to think we can do it with an appeal to the war on terror.”
Seen through Pakistani eyes, however, General Kayani was a more tangible, even positive, force. Despite his personal antipathy for the country’s civilian leadership, he restrained army meddling in politics and tolerated increased criticism in the news media. After the country’s first successful completion of a democratic election cycle, Pakistanis can dare to imagine that a long era of military coups might be over.
Further, he was at least partly successful in refocusing the army’s monomaniacal attention on India, the old enemy, toward a new threat posed by the militants lurking in the country’s remote areas.
Still, in other respects, Pakistan’s bullying military class has remained unchanged, particularly in its dismal record on rights abuses. General Kayani’s soldiers and spies have prosecuted a dirty war against separatists in Baluchistan Province, cultivated contacts with sectarian militias, and intimidated and bloodied rights campaigners and journalists.
For all that, his authority was never seriously challenged. “He’s one of the most powerful generals Pakistan has ever had,” said Vali R. Nasr, the dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Now, as he hands off to his successor, at a time of diminishing American engagement in the region, the largest question about the enigmatic general is how much of that legacy will endure.
In many ways, General Kayani was the antithesis of the swaggering general and junta leader he succeeded, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and his mandate after taking the top army post in 2007 was to repair the prestige that was tarnished under General Musharraf’s watch. He has been quiet and philosophical where General Musharraf was loquacious and boastful. Foreigners complained that his reserve could be unnerving, and that he mumbled. In meetings, he sat like a perched eagle, occasionally darting out for a cigarette.
Those who knew him well said his public reserve was simply a tactic: In private, with small groups he trusted or needed, he could be blunt and forceful.
“He was the anti-Musharraf,” said Shuja Nawaz, the author of “Crossed Swords,” a history of the Pakistani Army.
But the rise of the Pakistani Taliban posed an immediate challenge. The Taliban’s drive to destroy the security forces and central government shook the Pakistani military’s jihadist sympathies, through unprecedented violence: the beheading of soldiers, the assassination of senior generals, and even suicide bombings against the feared military spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI.
An audacious assault on the army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi in 2010 was particularly worrisome: The attackers came within a few hundred feet of the general’s personal office, and were aided by army conspirators.
General Kayani’s response to the Taliban included a successful military offensive in the Swat Valley in 2009, and orders to dust off the army’s creaky, India-centric military doctrine, which he infused with modern counterinsurgency doctrine.
And he publicly acknowledged the country’s Frankenstein problem: Jihadist groups that the army had once nurtured to fight Indian interests in Kashmir and elsewhere had become a menace to Pakistan’s stability.
“We as a nation must stand united against this threat,” he said in a widely acclaimed speech in August 2012.
But the army only partly embraced this conversion, to the immense frustration of American officials, especially Admiral Mullen. No other American worked so hard to cultivate General Kayani, whom he visited 26 times in Pakistan — more than any other foreign military leader, including those in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The two generals played golf in America and held long working dinners in Rawalpindi. Some American officials joked about a “bromance.” But in September 2011, just before he left office, Admiral Mullen exploded with anger in testimony to Congress that suggested a personal betrayal.
Despite years of cajoling General Kayani to cut the military’s ties with the Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban’s most virulent allies, Admiral Mullen charged that the group was a “veritable arm” of General Kayani’s ISI.
“He believed he had failed,” said an American official familiar with Admiral Mullen’s efforts, adding that the two men have not spoken since.
But Admiral Mullen’s outburst reflected a broader American frustration with both Pakistan and Afghanistan after 2001: that despite warm handshakes and billions in aid, local leaders stubbornly refused to comply with American demands.
With General Kayani, it came down to a confidence vote on the future of Afghanistan. He and his staff did not believe American assurances of a stable Afghanistan in which India, Pakistan’s main preoccupation, would be excluded, so he hedged his bets by refusing to turn the army’s guns on the Haqqanis, American and Pakistani officials said.
“The problem with our Afghanistan strategy is that everything about it was anathema to Pakistan,” said Mr. Nasr, who previously served in the Obama administration. “You can’t have a partner who sees everything you do as a threat to his own interests.”
Those contradictions unraveled most spectacularly in 2011, a year of serial crisis that plunged relations with Pakistan to their nadir: a C.I.A. contractor gunned down two men in Lahore, a Navy SEAL raid killed Bin Laden a few miles from the military’s main training academy just days after General Kayani had spoken there, and American aircraft mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on the border.
General Kayani, under pressure from other generals, closed a C.I.A. drone base within Pakistan, froze military cooperation and temporarily closed NATO supply lines into Afghanistan. But through it all, American and Pakistani officials said, he kept the relationship going — even though it cost him politically within the angry Pakistani officer corps.
General Kayani himself was furious with American leaks, like the diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks, undermining his standing in Pakistan. In one meeting with the American envoy Richard C. Holbrooke, he produced an annotated copy of Bob Woodward’s book “Obama’s Wars” and demanded to know who had leaked the information about him that appeared inside.
Incongruously for a country where generals have ruled for half of its 66-year history, General Kayani had greater success with Pakistani civilians. He closed the ISI’s infamous political cell, the traditional dirty-tricks unit for political interference, and oversaw largely successful elections in 2008 and last May.
Douglas E. Lute, a former security adviser to President Obama, said General Kayani told him with pride about his participation in elections. “He described putting on his best business suit, going down to the station and voting,” he said.
Still, General Kayani was hardly softhearted. He steadfastly wielded his unofficial veto power over the country’s foreign and security policy, often operating through pliable civilian ministers.
He continued to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal — still in the direction of India — and his troops and intelligence operatives faced accusations of gross human rights abuses.
Inside the military, his reputation was hurt by stories that corrupt relatives had grown rich on military supply contracts. “Did Gen. Kayani’s brothers make billions?” read one newspaper headline this week.
Now, after an extended term as army chief, he is retiring at a time of institutional flux in Pakistan. President Asif Ali Zardari stepped down in September; the country’s mercurial chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, leaves next month.
Whether General Kayani’s policy of militant restraint endures will depend partly on his successor — a choice that reflected a rare defeat for him, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ignored his recommendation in favor of the new army chief, Lt. Gen. Raheel Sharif.
But for all General Kayani’s impenetrable airs, one thing seems clear. Pakistan’s core strategic doctrine — distrust of India, and an accompanying insistence on exerting control through proxies in Afghanistan — is likely to remain unchanged. It predated his rise to power. And in the end, his legacy may come to be seen as the general who protected that doctrine, for better and worse, through the stormy years of American involvement in the region.
“He can say, ‘I survived the Americans,’ ” Mr. Nasr said.
Western army commander briefs Omar Abdullah
Indian Army's Western Command chief, Lt. Gen. Philip Campose Tuesday called on Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and briefed him on security issues, a statement said.
"During the meeting, various issues relating to prevailing security situation and concerning law and order were discussed in the meeting. The army commanders presented resume on these issues in detail," a defence statement said.
Lt.Gen. Campose was accompanied by 9 Corps' commander Lt. Gen. Parveen Bakshi, 26 Division commander Maj.Gen. Ashwani Kumar and 29 Infantry Division commander Maj.Gen. Balbir Singh.
Besides the army's northern command that guards the Line of Control, the western command guards the international border between India and Pakistan in the Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts of the state.
Nuke capable Prithvi-II missile test likely on Tuesday
India is likely to test fire surface-to-surface ballistic missile Prithvi-II from a defence base off the Odisha coast on Tuesday. The test, a part of user training exercise will be conducted by the armed forces from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur.
With a maximum striking range of 350 km, this nuclear-tipped missile is capable of carrying a pay-load of 500 kg. Prithvi is the first missile to be inducted in the armed forces and touted as one of the proven missiles of the country.
Defence sources said the preparations for the test had reached final stage. The missile will be tested from the launching complex-III by a special regiment raised by the Indian Army with the logistic support from the DRDO.
“The range integration has been completed. If everything goes according to the programme and weather favours, the test would be conducted by the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) any time in between 8 am to 10 am,” a source at the test range informed.
Prithvi, the first ballistic missile developed under the country's prestigious Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). The nine-metre tall missile is a single stage, liquid-propelled system. It weighs around 4.6 tonnes.
Prithvi missile has three versions – land, air force and naval. It is thrusted by liquid propulsion twin engine and uses Advanced Inertial Guidance System (AIGS) with maneouring trajectory and reaches the targets with a few metres accuracy. Developed as a battlefield missile, it could carry a nuclear warhead in its role as a tactical nuclear weapon.
The Prithvi missile can be taken close to the forward line over any kind of terrain. It has been designed to deliver advanced conventional warheads deep into enemy territory. The missile stops climbing when it reaches an altitude of 30 km and dives the target at an 80 degree angle.
Since 2002, Prithvi has been in use by the Indian Army with the overarching logistical control and support retained by the Indian Air Force (IAF). It was successfully test-fired on October 7 for the last time.