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Monday, 23 November 2009

From Today's Papers - 23 Nov 09

Maj Unnikrishnan's Father Speaks






New Delhi, November 22
Commander Dilip Dhonde of the Indian Navy, the first Indian to attempt to circumnavigate the world alone, yesterday reached Christchurch in New Zealand after covering 9,000 nautical miles.

A large crowd, including several Indians, welcomed Dhonde at Lyttelton Port of Christchurch. His last port call was at Fremantle Port in western Australia from where he set off Nov 1.
“Mhadei, the Indian Naval Sailing Vessel, along with Dhonde at the helm entered Lyttelton Port today (Saturday). He will set sail for Falkland Islands (South Atlantic Ocean) Dec 6 after tending to the various maintenance requirements of the boat,” Indian Navy spokesperson Commander P.V.S. Satish told IANS here.
Dhonde, 42, embarked on the solo circumnavigation of the world on Aug 19 this year from Mumbai. Less than 300 people the world over have succeeded in this endeavour till date, with this being the first attempt for an Indian.
Speaking about his experience on his blog, Dhonde said: “Since the last three days winds gusting to 55 knots, swell - 8 to 9 metres, temperature below 10 degree Celsius. Stay sail came down yesterday probably due broken halyard, waiting for winds to reduce to put it up. Starboard wheel had to be disconnected as the base holding its ram connection to the rudder broke in heavy weather so one electronic autopilot less and no Wind Vane autopilot.”
“Port, and only, autopilot groaning badly and threatening to rip its base out! Doing over 8 knots with just 1/3 of main sail, 03 reefs, and still getting overpowered at times! Forecast predicts winds to reduce after tomorrow, keeping my fingers crossed!” adds Dhonde.
Mhadei, during her voyage of over 21,600 nautical miles (38,880 km) under sail will take on the exceptional winds and swell which are prevalent especially below 60 degree south latitude called the Screaming 60s.
“This feat is often compared to conquering of Everest (the highest peak in the world) yet ironically is one that requires greater mettle and much longer time. The perils of the capricious sea and the vagaries of the unpredictable weather in a lonely sailboat become the canvas where this Herculean challenge to the human spirit unravels,” Satish added.
“Mhadei will sail for approximately nine months and is stopping at only four ports - Fremantle (Australia), Christchurch (New Zealand), Port Stanley (Falkland Islands) and Cape Town (South Africa) before returning to Mumbai,” the spokesperson added.
There are four pre-requisites to qualify for a circumnavigation voyage. First, it should start and end in the same port - Mumbai in this case - crossing all meridians of longitude at least once and the equator at least twice.
Second, the distance covered should be more than the length of a meridian, 21,600 nautical miles. Third, the boat should not pass through any canals or straits, where use of engines or towing would be unavoidable. And fourth, the boat should round the three Great Capes - Cape Leeuwin (Australia), Cape Horn (South America) and Cape of Good Hope (Africa). — IANS








China test-fired N-missile in October
So far, only US and Russia have such capabilities
Ajay Banerjee
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, November 22
Adding a new dangerous dimension to its growing arsenal of weapons, China has tested a long-range nuclear missile which will have the mobility to be moved around and fired upon a specially designed truck. All this retaining the ability to fire at targets located across continents.

In military parlance, it is known as a mobile inter-continental ballistic missile or a mobile-ICBM.
It can fire at targets up to 11,000 km away, hence making large parts of north-western US and Canada within the Chinese missile reach. Also areas like eastern part of Europe will be within its reach.
So far, only the US and Russia possess such equipment and the two countries had started working on it during the peak of cold war during the 1980s.
Indian intelligence agencies have informed the government that China tested its mobile-ICMB in the middle of October at its Wuzhai space centre in Shanghai province.
The dangerous and long distance missile code named ‘Dongfeng 31-A’ was launched from specially designed mount on a truck, said sources while detailing about the secret test about which details are filtering in now.
Unlike India, China has only a government-run media and no independent media outfits, hence there have been no reports about the test in the Chinese newspapers or TV. The information about the test has come across through one of the intelligence agencies.
So far the Chinese ability to fire a missile from a truck was restricted to smaller range of missiles, this mobile-ICMB is surely a dangerous weapon, said a senior official. Sources said ‘Dongfeng 31’ is the code name for the Chinese ICMB and the ‘A’ is to denote it mobile variant.
With this China can now not only move its warheads to locations it wants, it will be make it much easier for China to hit at enemy targets at distant places.
A well-informed China watcher said the Chinese were facing a problem with their ICMB due to the poor quality of sealing between the solid fuel chamber and the booster casing, this seems to have been sorted out.
China, has possessed ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. The ability of firing the same from a truck is seen as achievement among strategic circles. Such a truck is called the transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL.
The TEL not only transports the missile, it erects it and also launches it from one single unit. The entire system is highly mobile.
Strategically this means, in a crisis, China can disperse its ballistic missile forces across the country making it sure that some of these missiles would survive a pre-emptive strike by an enemy.







DRDO developing herbal shield for N-war
First such project of its kind in world where extracts from herbal plants are being used
Vijay Mohan
Tribune News Service

Chandigarh, November 22
In the backdrop of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons being a major factor in the geo-political security environment, the DRDO is developing herbal protective measures to guard the fallout of the use of such weapons.

This is the first such project of its kind in the world where extracts from herbal plants are being used to produce agents to protect humans against radioactivity. Besides military applications, the spin-off of this project will also have spin-offs in civilian sectors like nuclear medicine and radiology.
“We are in advance stages of clinical trials of these products,” Dr W Selvamurthy, Chief Controller, DRDO, said here on Friday. “Clinical trials are expected to take about a year after which the products will be sent to the Drug Controller of India for ratification,” he added.
Dr Selvamurthy said at present there was only one chemical agent available to combat radioactivity, but that was very toxic and hence dangerous to handle. The herbal products would counter this drawback. Extracts of two plants, podophylum hexandrum and the well-known seabuckthorn, are being used in the project being undertaken by three different DRDO laboratories at Leh, Delhi and Gwalior.
The plants grow only in high altitude areas above 9000 feet and are native only to the Himalayas. Efforts are on to cultivate the plants in the DRDO laboratories to ascertain their characteristics and their ability to adapt to other geographical conditions for mass-scale production, Dr Selvamurthy said.
Some other herbal products developed by the DRDO for use by the armed forces include UV protection agents, high energy food items and insect repellants. The DRDO chief said so far NBC warfare and protection items worth about Rs 800 crore developed by the DRDO and manufactured by the industry had been supplied to the armed forces.
These include sensors, detection systems, individual and collective protection systems and medical equipment.
The DRDO has recently supplied about 25 underground shelters for protection of troops in an NBC environment. Each shelter can sustain about 30 men for four days.
Orders for another 100 such shelters have been received. Under the 11th Five-Year Plan, major research and development work is being undertaken in application of nanotechnology and lasers for bio-sensors and stand-off NBC detection systems. This includes “smart” protective clothing that automatically decontaminates itself.





Revealed: what delayed NSG on night of 26/11
Toral Varia
CNN-IBN
MEN OF GRIT: The National Security Guards defend Mumbai during the November attacks.

Mumbai: The National Security Guards (NSG) took 60 hours to eliminate the terrorists who attacked Mumbai on November 26 last year, but the elite commandos could have finished the job quicker if time had not been lost.

J K Dutt, who was NSG chief in November last year, told this to CNN-IBN in an interview before the first anniversary of the Mumbai attacks. “I think in operations of this nature time is of the essence,” said Dutt.

And time was lost. Dutt explained the NSG was called in almost three hours after the terrorist attacks. “The point is that the attack took place at around 9.30 pm. Law and order being a state subject it was for the state authorities to decide when they wanted Central (government) forces. When the word finally came in it was 12.50 am in the night, and that was November 27th.”

Dutt said an aircraft at the Delhi airport was assigned to take NSG commandos to Mumbai but there was no pilot or crew. The pilot and crew had to be called up from their residences, but then loading NSG’s equipment manually delayed the flight to Mumbai.

"By the time we took off it was three in the morning and by the time we reached here (Mumbai) it was 5'O clock," said Dutt. Equipment then had to be unloaded manually and put on waiting trucks and buses.

"After we were asked to move there was no delay, but probably NSG could have come here (Mumbai) earlier,” said Dutt.

“If soon after the attack--say after 30 or 45 minutes--the NSG had been asked to move, in that case we could have reached three or four hours in advance. I think in operations of this nature time is of the essence.”

Dutt said the NSG was not given any clear intelligence on the number of terrorists holed up in the Taj Mahal Palace and Trident Hotels--the estimate varied from 10 to 30--and the maps of these places were “rudimentary”

Dutt refused to comment on suspicions that the terrorists who allegedly came from Pakistan had local links in India.





In search of the killer app
Maroof Raza
Posted online: Nov 23, 2009 at 2355 hrs

The attacks on several targets across Mumbai on November 26 last year, clearly caught the Indian government off balance—since there had been an assumption that terror groups from Pakistan would avoid adventurism at such a scale. Hence the reaction that followed at the politico-bureaucratic levels and more specifically the clumsy and slow deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) and Special Forces (SF) commandos, gave the impression that India lacked both the necessary preparedness for a rapid and robust response to such crisis and the equipments that is needed by special forces to battle such attacks of terror.

The immediate post 26/11 phase saw an initial flurry of activity and pronouncements that all the necessary equipment would be obtained for our military and police forces to prevent a ‘Mumbai-II’ in future. However, an year down the line, the army’s and police wish list remains far from fulfilled, for the necessary reconnaissance and surveillance equipment, that would keep the country alert towards another such terror attack.

Even the establishment of a maritime cum coastal security set up, possibly from the Indian Navy, to provide India’s vulnerable coastal areas a security template to prevent future attacks coming in from the sea, is yet to be implemented intotality. The story in terms of technology acquisitions is an equally dismal one too. Indian defence purchases are projected to double to more than $40 billion by 2012; and then to around $80 million a decade later. But little of that is likely to go towards internal security, an area that requires immediate attention. Part of the confusion lies in the fact that India’s armed forces wish to prepare for another Indo-Pak or a Sino-Indian war, but one that is unlikely to happen, preferring internal security—and the battles against terror—to be left to the police forces. And the police is hopelessly ill-prepared or equipped to do so. Very little if anything at all, has been done to acquire the necessary technology to equip India’s police forces, to avert another 26/11 type of attack.

For instance, the police and paramilitary forces do not have the protection system for their personnel or their vehicles. In an era when a terrorist will at least carry the automatic AK-47’s, our police men still carry antique bolt action rifles, that are slow and tedious to operate. While a terrorist uses sat-phones and GPS navigational systems, the policeman has VHF radio sets that cannot function in cities like Mumbai with high rise buildings. And as lethal explosives are now a norm amongst terrorists,our hapless policemen have few sensors with the small teams that is a key to the quick responses that battling terrorism requires. And training simulators haven’t even been seen in a police station. In short, we cannot expect the police to stall a terrorist attack.

Even, the National Security Guards who battled the terrorists in Mumbai for 60 hours after their shoddy arrival due to the confusion regarding their airlift from Delhi to Mumbai, have yet to receive dedicated aircrafts for each of their units now deployed in and around key metropolitan cities of Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore and Chennai. Each of these units would require their own airlift capability, by replacing the Indian Air Force’s fleet of aging AN32 and IL76 transport aircrafts. These specialised commandos still need to be integrated better with the local police force in each of the key cities that they are deployed.

All of this is yet to begin and without this they remain far from prepared for the next crisis. The armed forces too need to set aside their obsession for large and expensive force multipliers and equip the foot soldier, our bulwark against the threat posed by terrorist, with essential night vision devices, high quality bullet proof equipment and communication systems, that would give soldiers battling terror both in jungles and urban high rise building, the kind of quick high quality connectivity that cellphones now so easily provide.

Moreover, the army’s aviation corps still have to make do with obsolete helicopters like the Chetak (HSA316B) and the Cheeta (HS315B) after ministry of defence scrapped the bill of 2007 to acquire the Eurocopter (AS-550 C3 Fennec) due to allegations of irregularity. This happened after four years of trials and evaluations. Clearly the Indian Army is far from its stated vision of finding a high quality futuristic force, as its soldiers make do with equipment that gives them the advantage against the ramshackle insurgence in Maoist areas, but certainly not against the GPS equipment and Kalashnikov carrying brain washed suicidal Jehadis from Pakistan.

And most importantly, what the attacks on Mumbai highlighted was the huge failure of maritime security and intelligence. This could have been avoided, had the Indian Navy and the coast guards, possessed maritime reconnaissance aircraft such as the French Atlantique, the Boeing P81 multi mission aircraft or the Northrop Grumman Maritime reconnaissance platform, apart from an upgrade to the Navy’s aging fleet of ships and submarines, that do not inspire confidence in coastal areas any more. And the IAF, apart from being obsessed with a mysterious need for 32 and a half squadrons—and so the need for 126 new fighters—would do well to note that battling terror needs more ‘eyes in the skies’ like the AWACS and remotely flown UAV’s.

However, having said that, it must be highlighted that in a military to military confrontation with any of our neighbours, India will continue to have the necessary military capacity, with guns, tanks, missiles and bombers. It is the capability to battle terror that we still lack. Above all, what India lacks is the trust and synergy between the multiple arms of Indian security establishment. And even if intelligence inputs are available, they take too long to be shared.

In most other countries, the key agencies at both the national level and within hot target cities all share the same communication systems; so as to respond speedily in a crisis.

In India, this is far from the case. Moreover, the urgent need of the hour is to revamp our entire police force to make them actually equipped, trained and able to battle threat of terrorism which goes a lot beyond just finding the beat constable with a lathi in his hand.

They have to be equipped, empowered, trained and suitably lead, if we are to be in a position to battle Mumbai-II. As yet, we are far from it.





Pakistan: Now or Never?
Perspectives on Pakistan
Brian Clougley is a South Asia defence analyst.  Reuters is not responsible for the content - the views are the author’s alone.

When the Taliban insurrection in Pakistan began in earnest, in 2004, the Pakistan army did not have enough troops in North West Frontier Province to combat the growing menace.  It was not possible for the army and the paramilitary Frontier Corps to conduct operations without considerable reinforcement.  In any event, the role of the lightly-armed Frontier Corps has always been more akin to policing than to engaging in conventional military operations. Dealing with inter-tribe skirmishes and cross-border smugglers is very different to combating organised bands of fanatics whose objective is total destruction of the state.

It was therefore decided to redeploy some units and formations from the eastern frontier to the west, but the main problem with the decision, no matter its appropriateness, was that troops facing India along the border and the Line of Control in Kashmir are skilled in conventional warfare tactics but not trained in counter insurgency (COIN). Retraining was essential if there was to be a properly conducted campaign against militants in the west of the country. The process requires much time and energy. (The British, for example, had
to design a training programme lasting up to eight months before units were considered effective to fight the terrorist Irish Republican Army. The US belatedly dealt with a similar problem before deploying units to Iraq, having learned the hard way.)

But there is another important factor in Pakistan’s equation of redeploying troops : the attitude of India.

The Indian government and people reacted strongly to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in September 2008 — quite understandably — and blamed Pakistan for fostering those who carried them out. Many in India considered that Pakistan actually had some formal and official role in assisting the attackers, and most Indians – spurred by an active media – now firmly believe that Pakistan was involved. In this atmosphere it was tempting for politicians, especially those of ultra-nationalist persuasion, to beat war drums and threaten Pakistan
with dire consequences if there were another terrorist outrage – which there is almost certain to be.

Although there was no reinforcement or movement of troops on the Indian side of the border after the Mumbai atrocities, Pakistan could not forget the major deployment, Operation Parakram, that took place in 2002 following a terrorist assault on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. There was no reason to be complacent concerning Indian intentions, given the similarity of the Mumbai and Delhi attacks and the ensuing rhetoric, and Pakistan’s armed forces were required to remain vigilant. There could be no question of lowering guard on the eastern border unless there were assurance from India that it would not engage in military action. This was not given.

Even after the initial outburst of anti-Pakistan bellicosity had died down, there came carefully composed but confrontational statements by major national figures who could not be ignored, and they came in a period of especial concern to Pakistan – the very time at which it was necessary to continue relocating troops from the eastern frontier area in order to combat the menace of terror and insurrection in the west.

On 4 June 2009 the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of India’s South-Western Air Command, Air Marshal KD Singh,  declared that  “In case of a misadventure by Pakistan in shape of major terrorist attack or the attack like the one we had on the Parliament, attack on our leader, a major city, public or hijacking an aircraft, can obviously lead to a reaction from India, which could be a short intense war.”

Then on 1 November 2009 India’s Home Minister, Mr Chidambaram, was reported as saying “I’ve been warning Pakistan not to play any more games. Let Mumbai be the last such game. If they carry out any more attacks on India, they will not only be defeated, but we will also retaliate with the force of a sledgehammer.”

The threat from Delhi, which many of us observers had considered to have been negligible, given the apparent pragmatism of the government of Dr Manmohan Singh, was spelled out in blunt and menacing terms. Given the prominence of those who warned so clearly of conflict, the prospect of an attack could not and cannot be treated lightly. For this reason many senior military officers in Pakistan argue that withdrawing units from the border could have serious consequences if India decided to engage in a “short, intense conventional war,” as a result of another terrorist attack. If there were strident enough allegations in India that the culprits had been trained in Pakistan, then there could be war. The army, the senior officers felt, would be failing in its duty if it dropped its guard along the frontier; so there had to be compromise, which, in military affairs as in most others, invariably results in a less-than-desirable solution.

The recent operations in the tribal areas, concentrating on South Waziristan, have necessarily been affected by the requirement to balance east and west troop numbers. It is much to the credit of the Pakistan army that it managed to restore peace in Swat and appears to be well on the way to effecting the same in South Waziristan. But the main challenge is to maintain control and prevent the insurgents from again taking over.  Concurrently there is the requirement to speedily rebuild the 200 girls’ schools that were destroyed by the fanatics, to implement a civilian-dominated justice system, and engage in large-scale social and economic development. This will take time, and, above all, commitment by skilled professionals whose security must be guaranteed, along with that of the population.

It should not be forgotten that there was no insurrection in the Tribal Areas before the US invasion of Afghanistan.  Although the tribes were never pussy cats, and often there had to be firm action taken when they went over the top in inter-tribal squabbles or other mayhem, there was no Taliban control. That ascendancy developed as a result of a flow of vicious fanatics from Afghanistan who were displaced by US and ‘Coalition’ operations.  It is absurd to loudly condemn Pakistan for “failing to seal the border,” when there are tens of thousands of US troops along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. If they can’t seal it from their side, with all their hi-tech gadgets, how can anyone expect the Pakistan army to seal the Pakistan side?

The other thing that US experts might consider is keeping quiet. For the White House National Security Adviser to pronounce that Pakistan must now conduct military operations in North Waziristan is not simply bizarre, it is insolent. The Pakistanis have had enough of people telling them what to do. Their military operations are being conducted with professionalism. It would be a good thing if a bit of professionalism and discretion were to be exercised by all the clever Washingtonians who drop into Islamabad to lecture those who are trying to cope with an emergency for which the US is largely to blame.





Pakistan scores in propaganda war
Shishir Arya, TNN 23 November 2009, 06:02am IST

NAGPUR: If it comes to claiming victories in wars, Pakistan certainly pips India, as the latter has opted to keep mum. A search on the Internet shows no 'official' Indian record on any of the wars, except the Kashmir conflict of 1947-48. Pakistan, on the other hand, minces no words in relating how it made India taste defeat, for which our country has no official answer in the public domain.

War history remains not for public view at home. Until now, there has not been even a brief account of the post-1948 conflicts, including on the official website of the Indian Army (www.indianarmy.nic.in). The history section in the website has a note saying "post-1948 operations are classified, and hence not mentioned".

The website otherwise has stories on the Mahabharata, medial history, World War II and the Hyderabad Police action. When TOI contacted the defence ministry regarding this, it faxed a single line reply after a week, "The matter of publication of war history is under active consideration of the government."

The Pakistani Army, on the other hand, has elaborate commentaries of how it humiliated the much bigger Indian Army on many fronts. Apart from the website, a video documentary - Dastaan-e-Shujaat - on the 1965 war, produced by the Pakistan Army's public relation wing - the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) has been recently put up on YouTube.

A similar documentary by the Chinese, on the 1962 war, called the 'Crushing Moment', is also available on YouTube. However, in India, the Sino-India war history is also classified, even though there is an indirect mention in the 1948 story that it proved to be a failure.

The Pakistan army website, www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk, is silent on the Kargil story, and so is India. However, there are ISPR documentaries on war heroes of that confrontation like one Havaldar Lalak Jan.

On the 1948 war, the Pakistani website says that by early 1949 "Pakistan had completed its formative stage, halting the Indian offensive, preventing it from totally overrunning Jammu and Kashmir and closing up to Pakistan's vital borders." The Indian version says the Pakistanis were driven away from many places and had it not been for the ceasefire, they would have been entirely repulsed. But it's only here that India has a reply to the Pakistani claim.

The Pakistani story on the 1965 history says it cost India dear. On the much talked about attack on Lahore by the Indians, the Pakistanis say, "To relieve pressure on the Lahore front, Pakistani armoured and mechanised formations overran Khemkarn, 6 to 8 miles inside Indian territory. Vital Indian positions at Sulemanki and across Rajasthan were captured in bold, swift attacks."

Pakistan claims to have captured 1,617 square miles of Indian Territory as compared to only 446 square miles of 'undefended' area going into Indian hands. Its picture gallery has a photo of Indian POWs - mostly Sikhs soldiers playing a three-legged game in a Pakistani jail - and some others showing captured Indian areas. India called for a ceasefire, just before Pakistan planned a counter offensive, the Pak Army website says.

Though Pakistan accepts 1971 as the most tragic period in its history, and flays the leadership for the debacle, it also speaks of beating back the Indians on the western front. On the surrender, it says the first ceasefire resolution moved by the US was vetoed by erstwhile USSR. After this six resolutions for ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian forces were moved, including one by China. Some of these were accepted by Pakistan, however, behind the scene machinations by India and her allies stalled a ceasefire implementation till the fall of Dhaka. The ceasefire had been perfidiously converted into a surrender, claims Pakistan.

On Siachen, Pakstan claims its offensive brought India to the negotiation table in 1989, accepting all their conditions. The area was vacated and declared a de-militarised zone, it says.

There have been demands for declassifying Indian war documents, and defence analysts too say it is time to do so, or at least make a brief mention without going into much detail. Former director general (artillery) Lt General Vinay Shanker says there is no reason why India should keep it an official secret for so long. If put in the public domain, there can be critical studies so that the past can be learnt from, he said. "If the facts are kept under wraps, we shall never learn," Shanker added.

Some experts say that the 1965 war is especially the stalemate, which has led to the silence. However, a former Indian Army officer of the rank of Major General clarified that Pakistan had taken some parts of the Khemkarn sector, but not the town as such.


Captain Bharat Verma of the Indian Defence Review had a similar opinion. He said that in 1965 India was on a winning spree but stopped in between. It also did not take advantage of its position after the 1971 conflict. The government must have a policy to declassify the documents after a period of 20 years or so, he suggested.

A senior government official said on condition of anonymity that during the rehearsals the army had always practised crossing the Ichogil Canal near Lahore. However, when it actually needed to do so, the Pakistanis were able to keep the Indians at bay. Pakistani history too boasts of having prevented the Indians from crossing the canal.





CRPF to enrol ex-servicemen
Tribune News Service
Chandigarh, November 22
The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) will carry out a special recruitment drive to enrol ex-servicemen in its ranks. Junior commissioned officers can join the CRPF as sub-inspectors while other ranks can enrol as constables on contractual basis.

The highlight of the special drive is that the physical, domiciliary and educational qualifications for both categories have been completely waived for veterans, though they should be medically fit and have a clean record, according to a circular issued by the CRPF headquarters.
Further, the selected ex-servicemen shall be entitled to draw their full military pension, along with contractual pay from the CRPF, which works out to be about Rs 17,500 per month for JCOs and Rs 11,500 for others.
Though there would be no written or preliminary examination, candidates would have to appear before special recruitment boards scheduled to be held next month at Jalandhar, Allahabad, Bangalore and Hyderabad.
The government has accorded sanction to 100 posts of sub-inspector and 2,000 posts of constables for ex-servicemen on contractual basis for one year. Selected individuals would be subject to service conditions and regulations as applicable to regular CRPF personnel.





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