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Thursday, 2 December 2010

From Today's Papers - 02 Dec 2010

4 DRDO labs are off US blacklist  Tribune News Service  New Delhi, December 1 The US has upgraded the status of four Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) laboratories in its Entity List, allowing the US companies to do business with them in transfer of critical technologies.  There has been change in the status of Indian labs in what is called the Entity List. As of now, the DRDO labs have been upgraded but are not in the same bracket as Israel and Canada, however, they are on a par with European countries. This includes some NATO countries, which form six-decade-old post-second world war countries. At the bottom of the banned list are countries like Iraq and Iran.  The top most are those forming the closet ring of allies with the US. Revoking the ban on technology transfer to the DRDO labs was one of the issues raised by India before President Barack Obama, during his visit to the country last month. The DRDO labs, including the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), were blacklisted by the US in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests by India. "The four DRDO labs have been taken off under the category, which banned transfer of technology," DRDO Chief Controller for Research and Development (Armament and Combat Engineering) S Sundaresh said.  The four labs are now placed in another section on the list, on a par with some European nations to whom latest, critical technologies can be transferred from the US.
Adarsh housing scam Encroached land to be reclaimed: Navy  Mumbai, December 1 In the wake of the Adarsh housing scam, the Navy has found out that a "huge number" of its plots were encroached upon, a top Navy official said today.  "We have started the exercise of identifying plots, its owner and the acquisition, whether they belong to Defence or Revenue department. We are checking all records of land holdings to ascertain whether it is in jurisdiction of Defence or Revenue department. We will be reclaiming all our Defence land," Western Naval Command chief Vice Admiral Sanjeev Bhasin said.  "A huge number of our plots are encroached upon, like in Mumbai's Navy Nagar, Geeta Nagar, Ganesh Murti Nagar and Sunder Nagar areas and at Kalyan in neighbouring Thane district," he said.  On the Geeta Nagar plot, the Maharashtra Government had assured that the slum dwellers would be rehabilitated under the SRA scheme by 2011, he said. The Kalyan plot is encroached by farmers for agriculture, he said.  "It is believed that the land is in possession of the Defence but it is still not clear who is the actual owner of the plot. So the matter is in the court. The owner is either the Defence or the Revenue department of the state government," Bhasin said, commenting on the Adarsh housing scam.  The issue needs to be resolved. There are irregularities in sanctioning, allotment and the environmental CRZ clearance. These issues are now being looked at, he said.  Asked why the Navy took such a long time to take cognisance of the Adarsh scam, he said, "I agree that somebody should have taken a note of the fact that such a huge building was coming up."  "It (Adarsh) is a sub judice matter now, so it is not appropriate for me to say what should have been done or not," the officer said.  Asserting that action would be taken against any Navy officer found involved in the scam, Bhasin said, "We are not holding any internal enquiry yet and are relying on the CBI enquiry." — PTI
Breaking glass ceiling Permanent Commission for women a good move  Women in India have broken one more glass ceiling with the government finally allowing the Army to clear a first batch of 12 women officers for permanent commission. These 12 officers, currently in the ranks of Major and Lt-Colonel, were Short Service Commission officers who until last week could serve for a maximum of five to 14 years.  However, credit for this progressive step goes not to the government but the judiciary. For, the decision comes within four months of the Supreme Court upholding in August this year an earlier Delhi High Court judgment directing the government to extend permanent commission to women officers from the Army's Medical Corps and the Judge Advocate-General. All along the government had been opposing this move as per a notification issued in pursuance of Section 12 of the six decade-old Army Act of 1950 that prohibits women from being given permanent commission. The celebrations, however, are limited to these two non-combat arms which are confined to hospitals and court rooms. The Indian armed forces have 6,749 women officers, over one third (2,591) of whom were recruited in the last three years. This decision has not been extended to support arms such as the Corps of Engineers, Signals and Intelligence which also has a fair share of women officers.  The Indian Air Force has by far been the most progressive by inducting women officers to pilot transport aircraft, including helicopters, across a country with a varied terrain. But India is still far behind the West, including even countries like Turkey which allowed its women pilots to fly bombing missions over North Iraq and in ISAF patrol missions in Afghanistan, or the UK, which allows women to serve in Artillery units. The US Air Force routinely allows women pilots to fly most combat missions, while beginning with the Norwegians, countries such as Australia, Canada and Spain allow women to serve on board submarines. In Britain, 67, 71 and 97 per cent of all posts, respectively, in its Army, Navy and Air Force are open to women. But the ultimate glass ceiling yet to be ever broken by women is serving as a combatant in the Infantry, which remains out of bounds for reasons ranging from the physiological to the psychological.
Fresh Wikileaks' cables revelations Pakistan making small nukes to target India Ashish Kumar Sen in Washington DC  While India's Ministry of External Affairs reserved its comments on Wednesday, the second instalment of the US State Department cables, accessed and leaked by whistleblower website WikiLeaks, reveal a worrying web of rogue elements inimical to India active in Pakistan.  The cables convey US officials' fears that rogue elements within the Pakistani government, and not Islamic militants, pose the greatest threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.  US diplomats in Islamabad were told Pakistan was working on producing smaller, tactical nuclear weapons that could be used on the battlefield against Indian troops.  "The result of this trend is the need for greater stocks of fissile material.Strategic considerations point Pakistan in the direction of a larger nuclear force that requires a greater amount of fissile material, Pakistani officials argue," according to a cable cited by Britain's Guardian newspaper, which had access to the leaked cables.  In its secret and less than flattering analysis of India's military contingency plans, codenamed Cold Start, the U.S. found that the Indian army was incapable of launching a rapid offensive against Pakistan as envisaged by the plan.  "It is the collective judgment of the mission that India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement," according to one of the messages from the US Embassy in New Delhi.  The US ambassador to India, Tim Roemer, however, warned in February that for India to launch Cold Start, would be to "roll the nuclear dice," according to the Guardian, Indian leaders no doubt realise that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they cannot be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a "response."  In a February. 4, 2009, cable, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, wrote that "our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP (government of Pakistan)facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon."  The Russians shared concerns that Pakistan was "highly unstable," according to a report in the Guardian. Yuri Korolev, from the Russian foreign ministry, told US officials: "Islamists are not only seeking power in Pakistan but are also trying to get their hands on nuclear materials."  The New York Times reported that less than a month after U.S. President Barack Obama assured reporters in 2009 that Pakistan's nuclear materials 'will remain out of militant hands,' Patterson was writing that she was not quite sure and was actually deeply worried.  Patterson said in a May 27, 2009, cable that Pakistan was dragging its feet on an agreement to have the U.S. remove a stockpile of highly enriched uranium. She wrote to senior U.S. officials that the Pakistani government had concluded that, "The sensational international and local media coverage of Pakistan's nuclear weapons made it impossible to proceed at this time."  A senior Pakistani official warned that if word leaked out, the local press would "certainly portray it as the United States taking Pakistan's nuclear weapons," Patterson wrote.  The cables also reveal the George W. Bush administration's opposition to Pakistani plans to release Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme who also ran the world's largest nuclear blackmarket.  Richard Boucher, then assistant secretary of state for South Asia, wrote on April 10, 2008, that the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad should "express Washington's strong opposition to the release of Dr. Khan and urge the Government of Pakistan to continue holding him under house arrest."  "The damage done to international security by Dr. Khan and his associates is not a closed book," Boucher wrote. But Khan was released 10 months later.
WikiLeaks: US on Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine  WikiLeaks, Updated: December 01, 2010 22:53 IST Ads by Google  Air Tickets @ Rs. 99 Only – Buy 1 Flight Ticket & Get 1 Free On All Bookings. Limited Time Offer!  Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 13:45 S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000295 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020 TAGS PREL, PTER, MOPS, IN, PK SUBJECT: COLD START - A MIXTURE OF MYTH AND REALITY REF: IIR 6 844 0101 10 (COLD START - A DAO PERSPECTIVE)      * Share this on     * NDTVTwitter     * NDTVNDTV Social     * Share with MessengerLive Messenger     * NDTVGmail Buzz     * NDTVPrint  Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer. Reason: 1.4 (b,d).  1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army's "Cold Start Doctrine" is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in the plan's existence than in any real world application. End Summary.  What It Is and What It Is Not -----------------------------  2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the Indian Army's slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal 2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility, and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start's genesis).  3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army's slow and lumbering military mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).  4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. India's prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if the plan is never actually implemented -- and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it -- news of Cold Start's existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.  Prospects for Cold Start  ------------------------  5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military's advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood.  6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold Start's reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh.  7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response, GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.  Comment  -------  8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question the GOI's willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled. This fact calls into question Cold Start's ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to USG officials. Cold Start is not India's only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear.
WikiLeaks: Pakistan's army is 'the problem' says India  Press Trust of India, Updated: December 01, 2010 14:05 IST Ads by Google  Air Tickets @ Rs. 99 Only – Buy 1 Flight Ticket & Get 1 Free On All Bookings. Limited Time Offer!  Washington:  Conveying India's view on its neighbourhood to the US, a top Indian official had told US' Af-Pak envoy in 2009 that most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to its military's intentions and informed him that post 26/11 India had consciously not attempted to take any measures that would destabilise the civilian government there.  In his meeting with Richard Holbrooke on February 16, 2009 in New Delhi, the then Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon also thanked the Special Representative for US' role in pressing Pakistan to act on India's dossier on Mumbai attacks and said that it was "remarkable that we got this far".  "Turning to Pakistan, Menon observed that the mood there had deteriorated over the past year, saying it had gone from euphoria after the return of a civilian government to worries over security and the economy," says a secret US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks.  The US has influence, however, "where it matters most," Menon, now the National Security Advisor, said referring to the Pakistan Army, arguing that "most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan's military," it said reporting on the meeting.      * Share this on     * NDTVTwitter     * NDTVNDTV Social     * Share with MessengerLive Messenger     * NDTVGmail Buzz     * NDTVPrint   "Not only must Pakistan's army shift its attention from east to west, Menon asserted, but it must also cut its links to jihadi organisations, who have gone global over the past five years.  "Supporting Pakistan's army is not the answer, he said, suggesting that changing its operating assumptions would be more effective," it said.  Menon also pointed out that in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, India had consciously not attempted to take any measures to destabilise Pakistan's civilian government, and had made every effort to continue trade and travel ties.  However, he said, Pakistan's Army continued to make things difficult for India, through ceasefire violations, infiltrations and continued support for terrorist groups.  "Menon noted that India, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, had consciously not built up troops on the border with Pakistan, as it had following the 2001 attack on its Parliament," it said.  Offered an initial Indian assessment of the Pakistani response to India's dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks, Menon thanked the US for its role in pressing Pakistan to act and said that it was "remarkable that we got this far".  Still, Menon maintained, Pakistan has further to go to bring justice to the perpetrators of the attack, and it is not clear whether it will continue on this positive track or, citing the Daniel Pearl case, recede when public pressure wanes, the cable said.  "Menon also speculated that many of the '30 questions' submitted by Pakistan were added after the investigation by politicians in response to domestic pressures," the cable said.  "We haven't reached the point of no return yet" for Pakistan's government to positively conclude the investigation, Menon stated.  Menon also offered that he did not believe the Mumbai attacks themselves would play a major role in India's upcoming elections, because efforts to capitalise politically on such a heinous event would likely backfire on any political party, the cable said.  On Afghanistan, Menon asked if the US was considering including Iran in a Core Group on Afghanistan. "Holbrooke referred to his interview with Tolo TV where he emphasised the need for all of Afghanistan's neighbours to be part of the solution, but said no policy decisions had been made".  Menon said he believed a contact group did not have to be formally set up yet, but rather if we "let it cook," it would form itself.  "Menon noted the interest China has had in such a group for the past two years, and added that Iran has been signaling to India for the last four months that it was interested," the cable said.   Read more at:
Indian Army causing Siachen Glacier to crack  ECOLOGICAL surveys conducted by SDPI indicate the Siachen Glacier has developed massive cracks, which if not checked, may lead to the development of streams and glacial lakes causing the glaciers to melt and disappearing leading to ecological disasters. The same has been confirmed through fresh satellite images, which clearly depict the impending ecological catastrophe. Indian Army had illegally occupied the Siachen Glacier in 1984 after its Operation Meghdoot. The Siachen Glacier is located in the eastern Karakoram range in the Himalaya Mountains at about 35.5N 77.0E, just east of the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. The conflict in Siachen stems from the incompletely demarcated territory on the map beyond the map coordinate known as NJ9842. The 1947 Boundary Commission did not clearly mention who controlled the glacier, merely stating that from the NJ9842 location the boundary would proceed "thence north to the glaciers." UN officials presumed there would be no dispute between India and Pakistan over such a cold and barren region. Till 1984 Pakistan controlled the region and international mountaineering expeditions obtained clearance for proceeding to Siachen from Pakistan. Various international maps also clearly showed the territory under Pakistani control. After 1984, India controls most of the Siachen Glacier itself, including all tributary glaciers. At 70 km (43 mi) long, it is the longest glacier in the Karakoram and second-longest in the world's non-polar areas. The glacier's region is the highest battleground on earth, where India and Pakistan have fought intermittently since April 1984, when Pakistan tried to wrest control of the territory from India. Both countries maintain permanent military presence in the region at a height of over 6,000 meters (20,000 ft). India based Jet Airways plans to open a chartered service to the glacier's nearest airlink, the Thoise airbase, mainly for military purposes. Since September 2007, India has opened up mountaineering and trekking expeditions to the forbidding glacial heights. The first group included cadets from Chail Military School, National Defence Academy, National Cadet Corps, Indian Military Academy, Rashtriya Indian Military College and family members of armed forces officers. The expeditions are also meant to show to the international audience that Indian troops hold "almost all dominating heights" on the important Saltoro Ridge and to show that Pakistani troops are not within 15 miles (24 km) of the 43.5-mile (70 km) Siachen Glacier. Ignoring protests from Pakistan, India maintains that it does not need anyone's approval to send trekkers to Siachen, in what it says is essentially its own territory. In addition, the Indian Army's Army Mountaineering Institute (AMI) functions out of the region.  India claims that the cracks have been caused due to global warming, however this is not true. The cause of these cracks is not global warming; rather it is the presence of the Indian army on the Siachen Glacier since 1984. The glacier is melting at an unprecedented rate and this has been attributed to the deployment of troops and establishment of permanent cantonments by India. Glaciers melt into glacial lakes, leading to the formation of a stream, which later joins the Nubra River. This has been due the attempts of Indian army to facilitate movement of its troops. Indian army is responsible for the cutting and melting of glacial ice through application of chemicals for construction of bunkers. Dumping of chemicals, metals, organic and human waste, and daily leakages from 2000 gallons of kerosene oil is leading to the glacial cracks. The causes of recent floods in Pakistan is blamed on La Niña but very less attention is paid toward the cloud burst in Siachen and Ladakh Region, which is because of an uneven development including development of airports and helipads on various locations of glaciers. The unprecedented cloud burst broke all records of rainfall of modern recorded history of meteorological data pertaining to the region. Since last couple of years it was emphasized and urged from the Indian government to save and preserve these glaciers, as these are declared climate change indicators. Since India has paid no heed and Pakistan has suffered, the Government of Pakistan must take India to the International Court of Justice to stem the glacial cracks otherwise unprecedented floods will wreak havoc in the country.
Indian Army issues Request for Proposal for procurement of Akash Weapon System By Frontier India | December 1st, 2010 | Category: Indian Army News | No Comments »  Indian Army has issued Request for Proposal (RFP) for procurement of Akash Weapon System. Army has issued it to a Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU) in October 2010. Bharat Dynamics Limited, which is a DPSU and manufactures most of the Indian missiles, produces the Missile. Bharat Electronics Limited manufactures the radar and private companies Tata Power and Larsen & Toubro for the launcher systems manufacture the launchers. Bharat Dynamics Limited is also the integrator for the system.  Indian Air Force has already inducted the Askash SAM system and has more on order. Indian Army was reluctant and dragged its feet on its induction. Army has been accused of placing faith in imports than the Indian systems. The tide turned after the new Chief of Army Staff General V K Singh took office. He assured the induction of the missile system.
Brahmos likely to be flight tested on Thursday BALASORE (Orissa): Brahmos cruise missile is likely to be flight tested from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur off Orissa coast on Thursday.  "Range co-ordination for the trial of Brahmos missile proposed to be conducted is near complete," an official of Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) said.  Brahmos, developed jointly with Russia , is a supersonic cruise missile and capable of being launched from multiple platforms like submarine, ship, aircraft and land based Mobile Autonomous Launchers (MAL).  One regiment of the 290-km range BrahMos-I variant, which consists of 67 missiles, five mobile autonomous launchers on 12x12 Tatra vehicles and two mobile command posts, among other equipment, is already operational in the Indian Army.  Similarly, Indian navy has begun inducting the first version of Brahmos missile system in all its frontline war ships from 2005.  The Army, on its part, is in the process of inducting two more regiments of the Brahmos Block-II land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), which have been designed as `precision strike weapons' capable of hitting small targets in cluttered urban environments.  The Brahmos missile is a two-stage vehicle that has a solid propellant booster and a liquid propellant ram-jet system. The missile can fly at 2.8 times the speed of sound. It can carry conventional warheads up to 300 kg for a range of 290 km. The missile can effectively engage ground targets from an altitude as low as 10 meters.  The first flight test of the Brahmos missile was conducted on June 12, 2001 at the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur in Orissa coast and the last trial, "at a supersonic speed in a steep-dive mode" was successfully carried out on Sept 5, 2010 from the same range.
Indian Army 'lumbering and slow': US envoy's cable  Posted on December 1, 2010 Filed Under News | Retweet   If India were to launch "Cold Start" — a quick, limited military strike to punish Pakistan —  its army will not to be able to carry it off as quickly as envisaged by the doctrine, says a leaked cable from US embassy in New Delhi. "Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating  initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement," said the cable sent on February 16 this year under the seal and sign of US ambassador to India Timothy Roemor.  This cable is among the scores of US state department papers released by WikiLeaks to selective news organisations around the world, who are putting them out in a staggered manner.  The existence of Cold Start as a military doctrine has never been confirmed by India, though there was widespread domestic criticism of the snail-pace amassing of troops at the border in response to the 2001 Parliament attack.  But Pakistan is convinced of the existence of Cold Start and makes it the cornerstone of its military strategy against India, clinging to it as the reason for not redeploying troops from its eastern front to the west for the war against terrorism.  Though admitting to lack of official confirmation of the doctrine, the cable says Cold Start was born in 2004 because of the widespread criticism of the "lengthy process of mobilisation, lack of strategic and operational flexibility" in 2001.  "In order to avoid the Indian Army's slow and lumbering military mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given…" goes the cable's description of the operation.  The key elements of the doctrine are: speed to pre-empt international effort to prevent it, limited penetration to avoid a nuclear response and overwhelming use of firepower to inflict massive, salutary punishment.  But the cable says that in the "collective judgement" of the mission (the US embassy in New Delhi), if and when Cold Start is used, the results will be mixed. There will be some initial gains because of quick response. But then the problems will kick in.  "Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement," the cable says, adding, "India would have to overcome, challenges that range from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply."

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