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Monday, 13 December 2010

From Today's Papers - 13 Dec 2010

Army contests report
Tribune News Service  Chandigarh, December 12 The Army Headquarters, in response to the report, “ 3 Colonels in dock for misconduct” published in this newspaper on Sunday (December 11), has clarified that only one colonel was found guilty of misconduct and not three.  The Army spokesman Major General Sanjeev Madhok claimed in a correspondence that the officer was found guilty of inviting a lady to his hotel room and not for “molestation or gambling”.  The spokesman also maintained that no action was recommended against the other two colonels who attended the court of inquiry as witnesses. Nor was the tour cut short as reported and the name of the inquiry officer was wrongly mentioned as Brigadier Siwach, he stated. The inquiry was actually conducted by Brigadier R. Jamwal.

Human rights violations in Tibet India shouldn’t keep quiet
by Kuldip Nayar  CAMP Hale at Colorado in the US is a long way from Tibet. But what joins them together is the training of some 2000 Tibetan warriors who have been taught the art of guerrilla warfare to fight the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China. The warriors have failed to deflect China from consolidating its position in the Buddhist kingdom which it annexed in 1947.  Yet they have not given up fighting. They continue to put up resistance here and there and harass at times the Chinese soldiers even at Lhasa, Tibet’s capital. Beijing sees the hands of New Delhi in the independence war that the people in Tibet have waged against China. Beijing is more convinced about New Delhi’s hand after Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna told China the other day that Tibet was like Kashmir, “our core problem”. The two governments discussed last week the delineation of the border but Tibet appears to have been settled as far as New Delhi is concerned.  But the Tibetans nourish a grievance against India, which accepted China’s suzerainty over Tibet after the British left India in 1947. Their complaint is that New Delhi declared China’s suzerainty over Tibet without consulting its people. This is also the complaint of the Dalia Lama, who took refuge in India in 1954 when he could not tolerate the Communist shoes trampling upon the spiritual and traditional ways of his people. He, too, believes that since India had no locus standi in Tibet, it had no right to accept China’s suzerainty over it.  Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, could see that the Dalai Lama was not safe in Tibet and, therefore, sent Indian officials to receive him on the border. This was a great gesture which was applauded throughout the world. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan leaders accompanying him, too, saw in India a country which gave shelter to the persecuted in the world.  But it became apparent to them soon that for good relations with China they, particularly the Dalai Lama, would have to face a bad time. He was placed at Dharamsala, a tiny hill station in Himachal Pradesh, and told not to have any contact with the outside world without permission from New Delhi.  A similar fiat was issued on his pronouncements. Understandably, Nehru was going through a bad patch with Chinese Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai, who talked of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai but forcibly built a road at Aksai-Chin, part of Ladakh, to connect Sin-Kaing with Tibet. It was Beijing’s betrayal which Nehru tried to cover up, lest the common man in India should get disillusioned with the build-up of friendly relationship with China that Nehru had done.  But even during the 1962 war with China, initiated by Beijing, Nehru did not utter a word about Tibet. Nor did he draw the world’s attention to the ethnic cleansing going on in Tibet. And that has been the policy of all his successor governments. At times, the Dalai Lama has felt “suffocated” and has complained against it to New Delhi. But there has been no change in its policy even when Beijing is hauling thousands of Chinese to Tibet to settle them there to change the complexion and convictions of the population.  A lonely Dalai Lama has pointed out that the centuries old Buddhist culture in Tibet was being destroyed with the influx of Chinese. But except for odd protests here and there, nothing concerted or concrete has come out. And the Chinese are squeezing out even the semblance of lofty religious practices that the Tibetans have defiantly followed.  Washington is said to be willing to appeal to the conscience of the people in the world to save the centuries’ old culture in Tibet. But how far it is willing to go is not known. After all, President Obama kept the Dalai Lama waiting to placate Beijing. Even when he met him, he looked like going over an exercise. The strong Chinese economy gives more laughter to the US citizen than a few drops of tears that the irking of conscience might do.  There are continuous reports of China nibbling at our territory. India is annoyingly quiet. But when Beijing puts its claim on Arunachal and when the visa for the people of Jammu and Kashmir is not stamped but given on a separate stapled paper, India should introspect why it accepted China’s suzerainty over Tibet without getting any assurance on the future. Today it is like an occupied territory, without the Tibetans having any say in governance. Unfortunately, the Dalai Lama is thinking of retiring at a time when he is needed the most to put pressure on China to honour at least the religious rights of the Tibetans.  Essentially, it is India which has to come out of its make-belief world and realise that good relations with China do not depend upon the curbs on the Dalai Lama or the silence over what is happening in Tibet. Beijing would probably respect New Delhi more if it were to find later saying openly what it feels about Tibet. Beijing should also realise that 80 per cent of India’s population, the Hindu, has always considered Tibet as part of the Kailash, the mountains where Lord Shiva rests. The Hindus have religious ties with Budhhism and see in the Dalai Lama a religious head.  No doubt, India accepted China’s suzerainty over Tibet in the wake of departure by the British because that was how they dealt with Lhasa. After more than five decades New Delhi cannot question the suzerainty but it can at least raise a voice against the atrocities committed in Tibet and the recurring violation of human rights.  New Delhi should realise that a suzerain is a ruler or a government that exercises political control. But a suzerain cannot claim the hold over the way the Tibetans want to live and the religion they want to follow. When China is changing the very complexion of the population in Tibet and when the ethnic population is being annihilated, it is not suzerainty but an act of suppression by a dictatorial regime. Power can eliminate anything, more so tiny Tibetan protest, but it cannot silence the humanity over the extinction of people, however small in number.  When India, with all its traditions of tolerance, buttressed by Mahatma Gandhi’s example of dignified defiance, fails to speak out, it only proves the dictum: the weakest is pushed to the wall. New Delhi can still protest against the misrule in Tibet.

Gurmeet Kanwal  India's first attempt at military coercion achieved only limited success. Operation Parakram, launched in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament, was the first full-scale mobilisation since the 1971 Indo-Pak war. It began on December 15, 2001 after the Cabinet Committee on Security’s (CCS) decision and was completed on January 3, 2002. It finally ended on October 16, 2002 when CCS belatedly recognised that the law of diminishing returns had been operative for many months already. In a face-saving move, CCS declared that troops were being "strategically relocated" and constant vigil would be maintained, especially in J&K.  Though the 10-month deployment ended without a conflict, the two nations came close to war on at least two occasions. The first window of opportunity came in the first week of January 2002 soon after the Indian Army had completed its slow-paced mobilisation. In the snow-bound areas of J&K the army had relatively few options to launch offensive operations across the LoC, but in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan the climatic conditions were ideal.  The United States and other Western governments, however, stepped in with astute diplomatic manoeuvres resulting in General Musharraf's ashen-faced commitment in a nationally telecast speech on January 12, 2002, that Pakistan "will not permit any terrorist activity from its soil". India backed-off, but troops remained in place in their deployment areas on the international border (IB) and the three strike corps remained poised in their concentration areas.  The second opportunity presented itself after a terrorist attack on the family quarters in the Indian army garrison at Kaluchak near Jammu on May 14, 2002. The summer weather was conducive for offensives across the LoC in Kashmir Valley as well as the Jammu division south of the Pir Panjal mountains. In Punjab and Rajasthan, though the 40-degree plus temperatures were hard on man and machine, the disadvantage was common to both the sides and major offensive action was possible. By this time the Pakistan army had also mobilised and was poised in defence. Despite high-pitched rhetoric and extensive saber-rattling, the government did not approve military strikes across the border.  Slow Pace of Strike Corps Mobilisation  While the formations responsible to defend the border - "holding" or "pivot" corps - were ready for battle within 72 to 96 hours of receiving orders, the three "strike corps" (1, 2 and 21 Corps) took almost three weeks to complete their mobilisation because their fighting echelons are based at long distances from the border. Hence, it was only in the first week of January 2002 that major offensive action could have been undertaken by the land forces.  This time the mobilisation was total. All leave was cancelled and the soldiers re-called for active duty. Almost all training establishments were closed down. Extensive operational familiarisation exercises were conducted and operational plans war-gamed, updated and refined. Ammunition trains brought reserve stocks to forward ammunition points. In the first week of January 2002, expectation about the impending offensive action had reached fever pitch and morale was at an all time high. However, the troops had no way of knowing that the national aim was to practice coercive diplomacy.  The army also addressed shortcomings in training that initial mobilisation had revealed. There were unacceptably large casualties and it was officially stated that till March 15, 2002, the army had lost 176 men in the operation due to mishaps in minefields, mishandling ammunition and explosives and traffic accidents. The defence minister reportedly stated in Parliament, that up to July 2003, the army suffered 798 casualties. It clearly emerged that the army's mine laying methodology and training and the system adopted for marking minefields to keep civilians and cattle away needed substantial improvement.  The cost of sustaining Operation Parakram was reported to be have been pegged by India's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) at Rs 7 crore a day. This works out to approximately Rs 2,100 crore over 10 months and, presumably, does not include the cost of mobilisation and de-induction. The minister told Parliament in October 2002 that Operation Parakram had cost Rs 8,000 crore, excluding Rs 300 crore compensation paid to people in border states where troops were deployed.  Lessons Learned - and not Learned  Perhaps the most important lesson emerging from the standoff was the inordinately long time that strike corps needed to mobilise for war. By the time these elite formations were ready to deliver a massive punch, the international community had prevailed upon India to give General Musharraf an opportunity to prove his sincerity in curbing cross-border terrorism. These strike corps are designed to penetrate deep into Pakistan and run the risk of crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold early during an offensive campaign.  The lack of coherent politico-military decision-making was clearly evident. It is not at all clear whether any military objectives were actually assigned by the political leadership. Asked whether the deployment was aimed at attacking Pakistan, the then army chief Gen S. Padmanabhan, said, "There were many aims, which were fulfilled." However, he also said, "Whenever there is a situation calling for the army's help, the latter's role should be well defined to avoid confusion."  Gen V. P. Malik, General Padmanabhan's predecessor wrote in the Tribune: "Despite speeches and international commitments…. Musharraf's efforts to rein in Jihadi groups… remained cosmetic and tactical… Infiltration across the LoC and other ISI operations continue… There is no let up in terrorist acts…" When mobilisation began, Vijayanta tanks of 1970s vintage, artillery guns that were even older and many other obsolete equipment were in frontline service. Analysts pegged the overall Indo-Pak combat force ratio at approximately 1.15:1.0 in India's favour during the Operation. Speaking as an MP in the Rajya Sabha less than a week after mobilisation began, former army chief Gen Shankar Roychowdhury blamed the "recurrent political controversies on military procurement in the last 15 years" for having "crippled the army's modernisation programme." Sadly, not much has changed in the last decade despite well-intentioned reforms in defence procurement procedures. Inordinate delays in decision-making and bureaucratic red tape continue to mar acquisitions, a large chunk of the defence budget is still surrendered year after year, large equipment shortages continue to persist and a CDS is yet to be appointed.  Strategic analysts in India were concerned at the adverse impact of the lack of resolute action on the credibility of India's deterrence. Former air chief A. Y. Tipnis said at that time: "We have shown enormous patience, now it is time to show we have resolve too. Inaction is damaging our credibility; people have begun to believe India incapable of taking any action." Brahma Chellaney wrote: "The harsh truth is that the government played a game of bluff not just with Pakistan but also with its own military… When a nation enjoys credibility, it can usually achieve its objectives with a mere threat to use force. However, when there are serious credibility problems, even modest objectives are difficult to accomplish. Vajpayee ended up practising coercive non-diplomacy."  The aim of politico-military coercion is to induce a change in an adversary's policies and actions through a credible threat of devastating punitive action in case of non-compliance. While trans-LoC terrorism from Pakistan continued, there was a definite reduction in its intensity. On the other hand, Pakistan steadfastly refused to either terminate the activities of the LeT and the JeM, detain their leaders and block their funds or to hand over even one of the 20 terrorists India had demanded. Training camps and other facilities for terrorists also continued to operate in POK. Hence, the government's aim of launching Operation Parakram was only partially achieved and the credibility of India's coercive diplomacy and military superiority was seriously undermined. Also, the opportunity to strike at the roots of terrorism in POK was once again squandered. Lack of political will was again demonstrated after the terror strikes in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, despite credible evidence that these had been launched by the LeT at the behest of the Pakistani army and the ISI.  As long as the Pakistani army continues to exercise a tight stranglehold over Pakistan's polity, unbridled control over its nuclear weapons, retains its unjustifiable size of 500,000 personnel in uniform and enjoys American patronage as a frontline state with MNNA (major non-NATO ally) status - which brings with it new military equipment, loan waivers and the rescheduling of loan payments on easier terms over longer periods - it will have no incentive to move towards genuine peace with India. The Kashmir issue is only the symptom of a much larger fundamental malaise. The Southern Asian region is likely to continue to witness periodic bouts of hostility between India and Pakistan, tempered by short interludes of tentative peace.  The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi  Top     The Operation  Operation Parakram was the second major military standoff between India and Pakistan since both countries achieved nuclear weapons capability in 1998. The 1999 Kargil conflict had been the first. The episode had also focused the world's attention on the possibility of a nuclear conflict in South Asia, and the impact any conflict would have on US operations in Afghanistan.  Following Indian deployments, Pakistan moved a large numbers of troops from the border with Afghanistan, where they had been trying to combat the Taliban and Al Qaeda, to the Indo-Pak border. In late December, both countries moved ballistic missiles close to the border, and mortar and artillery fire was reported along the LoC. By January 2002, India had mobilised around 500,000 troops and three armored divisions. Pakistan responded by deploying around 120,000 troops. This was the largest buildup in the subcontinent since the 1971 war.  Tensions decreased somewhat following Mushraff's January 2002 speech, but shot up again in May, when three terrorists killed 34 people iin an army camp near Jammu. On May 18, India expelled Pakistan's High Commissioner. The same day, thousands of villagers fled Pakistani artillery fire in Jammu sector. Separatist leader Abdul Ghani Lone was assassinated on May 21, and the next day Prime Minister Vajpayee warned troops to prepare for a "decisive battle." Beginning May 24, Pakistan carried out a series of missile tests. On June 7, an Indian UAV was reportedly shot down near Lahore in Pakistan.  Alarmed at the possibility of a nuclear war, the US asked all its non-essential citizens to leave India on May 31. A visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin could not mediate a solution. But by mid-June, the Indian government accepted Musharraf's pledge to end militant infiltration into India, and on June 10, restrictions on over-flights from Pakistan were removed by India. Indian warships were also recalled from deployment from the vicinity of the Pakistani coast.  While tensions remained high throughout the next few months, both governments began easing the situation in Kashmir. By October 2002, India and Pakistan had begun to demobilise their troops along their border and in November 2003 both countries agreed to ceasefire along the Kashmir border.

From jawan to Gentleman Cadet and back
 Alok Kumar, a cadet undergoing training at IMA, was shunted out for theft Sandeep Rana Tribune News Service  Dehradun, December 12 He is no longer a ‘Gentleman Cadet’. He would possibly never become an officer either because weeks before the ‘passing-out parade’ last year, the Indian Military Academy threw out Alok Kumar, reverted him to an Army unit as a jawan and imposed a fine of Rs 11, 59,500, the amount spent on his training at the academy. The ‘fine’ is to be recovered from his salary over the next 12 to 15 years, which means he would virtually remain without salary.  Curiously, Major Amit Dagar, the IMA spokesman, failed to recall the case, when contacted, and shrugged it off by saying that there are far too many cases of such indiscipline. Alok Kumar’s is a strange case because the young man apparently joined the Army as a jawan. He worked his way through and cleared tests and examinations before he was found fit enough for the IMA. This month he would have walked out of the academy with a permanent commission as an officer.  But whatever could have prompted this ‘young achiever’ to steal? According to reports trickling in, he had taken out a sum of Rs 80,000 in all from the account of a fellow cadet. His lawyer claims that Alok Kumar did it in desperation because he needed the money urgently for the medical treatment of his mother.The lawyer, who has challenged the disciplinary action taken by IMA, also claims that the cadet had admitted his ‘mistake’ and returned the money. Under the circumstances, he pleads, the punishment is too harsh.  Several officers within the Indian Army, argues Major K Ramesh, the lawyer, have got away with far less rigorous punishment for worse, and bigger, mistakes. As a sepoy, Alok would never be able to repay the fine even if he forgoes his entire salary for the next ten years.Alok completed military training at Army Cadet College from January 6, 2006, to December 6, 2008, followed by advanced military training at the IMA from January 14, 2009, and was to pass out on December 12, 2009, and become a permanent commissioned Army officer.  His pleas for less harsh punishment and relegation for six more months or a year were dismissed. The IMA also did not consider the mitigating factors like admission of guilt and return of the sum ‘stolen’. His last resort, an appeal, pleads that there exists a system of relegating the GC by six months, which is resorted to for first time offenders.  In case the offence is repeated or other complaints surface, the cadets are withdrawn permanently. “In case of a court martial of a Brigadier for misappropriation, has the court ever imposed such punishment? The Section 71 of the Army Act, 1950, clearly forbids this type of fiscal imposition,” claims Ramesh.

Adarsh scam: CBI may finalise case this week
NEW DELHI: The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is likely to finalise its case to enable it to probe and prosecute those responsible for the Adarsh Housing Society scam this week.  CBI sources speaking on condition opf anonymity said a meeting could be held some time this week to finalise the names of people who could be booked for professional misconduct and abuse of official positions under the Indian Penal Code.  It could include the names of bureaucrats, politicians and some army officials, they added.  On saturday, the Indian Army's Southern Command, which is headquartered in Pune, had ordered a probe to find out which army officers had issued a no-objection certificate to the Adarsh Society to construct a 31-storeyed complex on a plot in upmarket Colaba in Mumbai.  The CBI probe is said to be independent of the army investigation, and has the sanction of the Ministry of Defence.  The 31-storey Adarsh Society, originally meant for Kargil war heroes, landed in controversy after media reports said several politicians, bureaucrats and defence personnel owned flats there.  The CBI had on November 15 registered a Preliminary Enquiry (PE) to probe the alleged role of former and serving Army officers, with the permission of Defence Minister A K Antony.  The plush housing Society, built on prime defence land, has been constructed in alleged violation of rules. It was originally meant to be a six-storey structure to house Kargil war heroes and their kin, but was later extended to 31 floors without mandatory permission.  The exposure of the scam forced the Congress party to seek the resignation of then Maharashtra Chief Minister Ashok Chavan .

Heeding Irom Sharmila’s Argument
 Posted by support on December 12, 2010 in
It’s been ten years since Irom Chanu Sharmila started her fast-unto-death. With no exceptions, hers would qualify to be the longest in the history of independent India. Liquid feeding through a tube attached to her nostrils keeps the 38-year old alive, although it is said to have weakened the resolve of the diminishing tribe of people who believe in peaceful modes of protest. The State has been accused of being inconsiderate and uncaring towards peaceful and Gandhian modes of protests. In reality, however, Ms Sharmila’s plea is caught in the gridlock between a seemingly accommodative political India and the obduracy of its armed forces.  It all started on November 2nd, 2000, the day paramilitary Assam Rifles personnel opened fire in panic after a blast went off at Malom, a small town about 15 km from Imphal, Manipur’s capital. Ten civilians waiting under a bus shed were killed and many others injured. Ms Sharmila, working as a volunteer for a human rights organisation, decided to go on a fast in protest the next day. Her demand was simple — withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which she, like many in her State, terms as draconian as it provides army personnel right to shoot and kill and get away without any punitive action. Her stand is supported by fact. The inquiry into the Malom incident has not ended till date. Fixing responsibility comes much later.  The AFSPA, promulgated to contain insurgency in neighbouring Nagaland in 1958 and introduced into Manipur in 1980, continues to be blamed for a number of killings of militants, former militants as well as civilians.  Interestingly, among the people who underline the need to make AFSPA more humane are Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Minister P Chidambaram. In 2004, shortly after the infamous Thangjam Manorama Devi episode — in which a woman militant cadre was allegedly raped and killed by the Assam Rifles personnel after being picked up from her residence in the outskirts of Imphal sending Manipur to a state of turmoil — the prime minister had assured the people of Manipur of efforts to make the Act humane. Such assurances have been periodically made since then. Speaking in April 2010, Mr Chidambaram indicated that he too is favour of replacing the AFSPA with a humane act. The inquiry into Manorama Devi killing too hasn’t concluded.  In 2004, New Delhi set up a committee under Justice B P Jeevan Reddy to review AFSPA. Over the next two years, the committee held intensive consultations with a wide spectrum of people and submitted its report to the government. Its recommendations have not been made officially public, but its contents are freely available. The committee had recommended, “The Act, for whatever reason, has become a symbol of oppression, an object of hate and an instrument of discrimination and high-handedness. AFSPA should be repealed.” The committee also said that instead of the AFSPA, the challenges posed by insurgency and terrorism could be dealt by making a few changes to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.  The recommendations were subsequently examined by the second Administrative Reforms Commission, which submitted its report in 2007. The commission too observed that “the repeal of the AFPSA would remove the feeling of discrimination and alienation among the people of the northeastern states.” However, the decision is pending before the Cabinet, which continues to procrastinate, for reasons which are obvious.  The Indian Army — Assam Rifles consists of army personnel on loan to this para-military organisation — remains fiercely opposed to any tinkering with the Act. The Ministry of Defence maintains that AFSPA is an enabling legislation and is a mandatory pre-requisite for the armed forces to carry out internal security duties. In Manipur, where the Army, not the police, does bulk of the counter-insurgency operations, no one can expect to antagonise the men in olive green. Moreover, toning down AFSPA would also have its impact in Jammu & Kashmir, where too the Act is in operation. Withdrawing AFSPA is too much of a risk for the government which is critically unsure of its intentions and achievements in conflict theatres.  At one level, making the AFSPA the villain is unjustified. The Supreme Court in its verdict in the Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights (NPMHR) vs. Union of India, 1997 case underlined the sanctity of the Act. Indeed, the Manipur Police — which does not enjoy the protection under the AFSPA for its activities — too has shot and killed with some impunity. Most recently in July 2009, Manipur police commandos were photographed accompanying and then killing a former militant in an Imphal market, an episode that led to prolonged agitation. Educational institutions shut down for more than six months before an agreement between the state government and the agitating groups restored normalcy. Seven of the nine accused policemen were arrested, suspended, but subsequently were granted bail.  At the other level, it is difficult to understand how a phased withdrawal of AFSPA and consequent non-functioning of the army, would augment insurgent capacities in Manipur. The Manipur government, responding to popular demands, had thrown out AFSPA from seven assembly segments in Imphal West and Imphal East districts in 2004, much to the displeasure of the Army. Since then, Army has refused to operate in these areas. But even then, these areas have not really degenerated into becoming hubs of insurgency.  The security situation in Manipur, often judged on the basis of insurgency related fatalities, has certainly improved in 2010. Compared to 2008 and 2009 when 485 and 416 fatalities were reported in the state, Manipur recorded only 130 fatalities this year (as of mid-November). This throws up an opportunity to embark upon a risky, yet much needed task of assigning Manipur police the lead role in counter-insurgency duties. It also opens up the possibility of withdrawing AFSPA from few other areas in the state, where the army’s role can be tactically downgraded. Reassigning primacy to the army and bringing back the AFSPA, in case the situation worsens, would not be too difficult a task. Opportunities certainly exist to make a new beginning for the state, instead of condemning it to hopelessness in perpetuity.  Bibhu Prasad Routray, a visiting research fellow in the South Asia Programme of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, is a former deputy director in the National Security Council Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, New Delhi.

Naga rebels giving out Indian Army positions to China
 Posted By admin On December 11, 2010 @ 11:29 pm In China Military News | No Comments  2010-12-12 (China Military News cited from NDTV) -- Reports have surfaced that Naga insurgents are giving away details of the Indian Army's deployment in the Northeast to China. These details emerged after the interrogation of a key leader of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak-Muivah (NSCN(IM), who the Indian intelligence agencies have caught a couple of months ago.  These details also include positions of aircraft and missiles. The special focus of these leakages, according to reports, are the areas around Twang in Arunachal Pradesh.  [1]  Government sources say not the Chinese government, but the Chinese intelligence agencies might have approached the NSCN(IM) through some front organisations for these details.  But the story doesn't end here.  The NSCN(IM), which has been engaged in peace talks with the Indian government for the last 15 years, has reportedly given approximately 700,000 US dollars for weapons. This points to the fact that while the peace talks are going on, they are arming themselves.  When the Indian negotiators took up the matter with NSCN(IM), they agreed to buying the weapons but said those arms have not been brought into India yet.

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