Boy dies after being shot by ‘jawan’ for trespassing
Chennai, July 3 A teenage boy today died of bullet injuries, after being allegedly shot by an Army jawan for trespassing into their premises, triggering protests from locals. Condemning the incident, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa alleged that a jawan had opened fire at 13-year-old Dilshan, a charge denied by the Army. The family of the boy, who later succumbed to injuries at a government hospital, also alleged that an Army jawan had shot at him. “The Army jawan could have easily realised that the boy who tried to climb a tree was not an extremist or a terrorist,” the CM said. Jayalalithaa, who announced a Rs 5-lakh compensation to the victim’s family, said the Chief Secretary had written to the General Officer Commanding to hand over the jawan, who committed the “brutal act”, to the state police. Dilshan was allegedly shot by a jawan when he tried to pluck some fruits from the premises housing residential quarters. An Army spokesperson, however, said there was no armed guard inside the Island Ground colony. The incident sparked tension in the area with locals protesting against the firing. — PTI
Probe ordered into hacking of NSG website
New Delhi, July 3 Hackers have breached the official website of the country's elite counter terror and anti-hijack commando force National Security Guards (NSG). The website - www.nsg.gov.in - and some official e-mail domains of the force were corrupted recently in a suspected hacking attempt, NSG sources said. The website domain has not suffered much damage and a technical probe has been initiated to identify the source of the attack which could have possibly existed outside the country, they said. The passwords of the official emails of NSG units and officials are also being renewed to keep them safe, they said. The NSG web portal hosts a number of facilities, including details of the tenders that the force procures for operational and administrative purposes. The portal is maintained by the technical wing of the force based at the headquarters here, in consultation with the National Informatics Centre (NIC). Recently, the official portal of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was also targeted by hackers. — PTI
Home Ministry likely to oppose Army’s proposal on ITBP
Leh/New Delhi, July 3 The Home Ministry is likely to oppose a fresh proposal of the Defence Ministry, seeking “operational control” of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) manning over 4,000 km of the country’s boundary with China in three different states. The move comes in the wake of reported differences between Army and ITBP jawans at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) after which the Army moved a fresh proposal for operational control of the paramilitary force in order to have “synergy” among the forces manning the border with China, sources said. While the Home Ministry is officially quiet on the issue, sources said it was of the view that such a move would be detrimental not only to the morale of the jawans of the ITBP, who have been performing their duties in utmost difficult terrain, but will also lead to confusion among the ranks of the paramilitary force. They said at a meeting held recently, the home and external affairs ministries found themselves on the same page and were of the view that this would unnecessarily complicate issues along the LAC with China. The Army had sought operational control of the ITBP because of the aggressive patrolling across the LAC by Chinese troops saying this would help in better border management. The ITBP has nearly four battalions comprising around 4,000 personnel in Leh. The ITBP maintains all its forward posts in higher reaches along the border with China at tri-junction located at a height of 22,420 feet on Mount Gya. The paramilitary force conducts long and short-range patrols to keep an effective vigil on inaccessible and unmanned areas on the border. “While we should be aligning the forces available with the Home Ministry, handing over the control of the ITBP was a far-fetched idea,” a senior Home Ministry official said. — PTI
Tata bid to take off in aerospace
Mumbai, July 3: The $70-billion Tata group is quietly building its presence in the aerospace industry that has recently seen significant investment from the private sector. It is in the process of applying for licences from several central government ministries, predominantly the defence ministry, to sell helicopters that it plans to assemble at its joint venture with Italian conglomerate Finmeccanica’s AgustaWestland. Speaking to The Telegraph, Tata Services Ltd resident director Bharat Wakhlu confirmed that the group had applied to the defence ministry as well as other government agencies for licences. The Tata group and AgustaWestland decided in early 2009 to form a joint venture that would establish a plant to assemble the AW 119 helicopter — an eight-seater utility copter meant for both defence and civilian uses. The deliveries were supposed to start by 2011, but the deadline has since been pushed back by a year. Sources said the joint venture was concurrently applying for licences as it went about putting up the assembly unit in Hyderabad. At the time the joint venture was formed, the production target was fixed at 30 units a year. The Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA) has estimated that the Hyderabad-based greenfield facility of this joint venture is likely to entail an investment of $30 million. The joint venture company, Indian Rotorcraft, will assemble and deliver these helicopters. It will target domestic as well as global customers. Estimates indicate that India will be a key market for helicopters with an expected demand of 800 units in the next decade from both the public and private sector. Late last year, another Tata group company, Tata Advanced Systems Ltd, rolled out the first made-in-India Sirkorzy S-92 helicopter cabins from Andhra Pradesh. These helicopter cabins, which were previously manufactured in Japan, were exported to Sirkozy’s assembly plant in the US. A recent paper by the CAPA on aerospace manufacturing in India said the Tatas and the Mahindra group with strong financial credentials had entered into various alliances to manufacture parts and assemble machines under offset agreements. “However, there are strong prospects and good reasons for these groups to move from defence offset to licensed manufacturing and beyond to civil aviation manufacturing as the defence market becomes saturated,” it added. Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M) had acquired Aerostaff Australia and Gippsland Aeronautics in 2009 as a part of Rs 1.75-billion investment and capacity building forays into aerospace components and aircraft manufacturing. Recent reports said Mahindra Aerospace Pvt. Ltd, the aerospace unit of M&M, is scouting for a technology partner to make aircraft components at a proposed plant in Bangalore. The CAPA says that the interest shown in aviation by industrial houses suggests a real opportunity for India to develop a presence in international aerospace manufacturing where other developing economies such as Brazil have done well.
Shipbuilders eye defence orders to tide over slump
Mumbai/Bangalore: Securing contracts to build warships has emerged as an option for local shipyards seeking to sail through a global downturn in the industry. ABG Shipyard Ltd, India’s largest shipbuilder outside state control, entered defence production last week by signing a contract with the Indian navy to build two cadet training ships together valued at Rs. 970 crore. “There is ample scope for defence contracts,” said Dhananjay Datar, ABG’s chief financial officer. “There will be a positive impact on valuations with defence portfolio in the order book.” The navy and the Indian coast guard have lined up projects worth at least Rs. 50,000 crore in the next 10-15 years to patrol the country’s coastline that stretches over 7,400km, according to the defence ministry. The government is also focusing on enhancing local defence production with private participation. Recently, Pipavav Shipyard Ltd announced changing its name to Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering Co. Ltd to better reflect its growing focus on defence and oil and gas sectors. The change in name came after Pipavav secured a licence to build warships for the Indian navy and a clearance from the Foreign Investment Promotion Board in March permitting foreign direct equity investment in the company. “Indian shipyards are facing a threat of a slowdown. There are no major orders coming their way. These companies have identified defence production to avoid idling of their infrastructure,” a shipyard consultant said, requesting anonymity. “Considering the flow of defence orders in the pipeline, the valuations of these yards will also have a positive impact.” Larsen and Toubro Ltd (L&T), India’s biggest engineering and construction company, began work in 2008 on a Rs. 3,375 crore shipbuilding yard at Kattupalli in Tamil Nadu, mainly for commercial ships, but had to change course after the global recession to focus on the defence business, a company executive said on condition of anonymity. For most yards, the current order books for building commercial ships will last till 2014 and new orders for such vessels aren’t coming by easily. “There is a lull all over the world. For shipyards, if orders from international companies are not coming, it has to come from somewhere,” said Revati Kasture, head of research at rating agency Credit Analysis and Research Ltd (CARE). “It is not just a question of slowdown or valuation,” Kasture added. “If you have a shipyard that has the capability to build defence ships, and customers, then why not?” Kasture said valuations will follow if investors see revenue coming to these shipyards from defence businesses. The defence ministry is evaluating options of placing orders with domestic shipyards and has asked shipyards to secure a rating indicating financial health from rating agencies, including CARE. The agency has carried out ratings for three shipyards in India, including ABG and Bharati Shipyard Ltd. About 42% of Pipavav’s $1.5 billion (about Rs. 6,700 crore) order book already comes from defence contracts. Pipavav has tied up with various foreign strategic partners, including SAAB Dynamics AB, Northrop Grumman Corp., and Babcock group UK to boost capabilities in the defence segment. The company proposes to convert an existing wet dock into a second dry dock to enhance the capabilities to build warships for the Indian navy and the export market, said a recent investor presentation made by the company. Analysts predict a bad year for shipping companies, with freight rates expected to remain low after a record delivery of vessels last year. A 25 January Fitch Ratings Ltd’s report said its 2011 outlook for India’s shipping industry is negative. The agency expects all shipping segments to face low freight rates because the net increase in capacity has exceeded demand. The Union government, too, has delayed a share sale in Cochin Shipyard Ltd over fears that the downturn in shipping will impact valuation, said a shipping ministry spokesman. The state-run shipyard, which is constructing the country’s first local-made aircraft carrier for the navy, has hired consultancy Ernst and Young to prepare a business and vision plan in the changed scenario for the next 10-20 years, a company spokesperson said. Last year, L&T won a Rs. 977 crore contract for designing and constructing 36 high-speed interceptor boats for the coast guard. Last month, Pipavav said it had signed a Rs. 2,975 crore order from the navy to build five gunboats. Cochin Shipyard last year won a contract from the coast guard for constructing 20 fast-patrol vessels valued at Rs. 1,500 crore.
Antony to visit Kyrgyzstan
Defence Minister A.K. Antony will leave here on Monday on a two-day visit to Kyrgyzstan to promote bilateral ties in a wide range of areas and also inaugurate the India-Kyrgyz Mountain Biomedical Research Centre. The unique institution has been established jointly by the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and the National Centre of Cardiology and Internal Medicine, Kyrgyzstan, to study high altitude acclimatisation and find measures to provide succour for maladies at high altitudes. Mr. Antony's delegation includes DRDO Chief V.K. Saraswat, Special Secretary R.K. Mathur, Secretary (Defence Finance) Vijay Lakshmi Gupta and Chief Controller of Research and Development, DRDO William Selvamurthy. On Monday, Mr. Antony will hold talks with his Kyrgyz counterpart, Abibilla Kudayberdiev. He will also hold talks with top leadership, including President Roza Otunbayeva, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kazakbayev Ruslan Aytbaevich and Health Minister Sabyrbek Jumabekov, an official release said.
Pune students to join Indian Navy
Two students trained by city-based Apex Careers have been successful in joining the defence forces. Radhika Dange has been selected for the Indian Navy through University entry scheme. She will be reporting to the Naval Academy in Ezhimala, Kerala. Radhika’s father, Lt Col Vilas Dange, is a retired army officer. Her mother is a school teacher in St Joseph High School, Colaba, Mumbai.Siddharth Joshi, a resident of Dahanukar Colony, Pune, has been selected as Sub-Lieutenant for the Indian Navy’s general service (executive branch) under the University entry Scheme. He too will be reporting to the Indian Naval Academy in Ezhimala, Kerala.Siddharth credits his family for the success. “I have been able to achieve success primarily due to the support and encouragement received from my parents and family friend, Group Captain Vishwajit Dedgaonkar,” said Siddharth.
China’s India War — How the Chinese Saw the Conflict
The author of India’s China War (1970), Neville Maxwell is a well-known specialist of the history of Sino-Indian border conflict. He was for eight years the Times correspondent in India. We are publishing, as a point of view, this article he specially sent to Mainstream. His earlier article—“The Pre-history of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Note”—appeared in this journal’s February 12, 2011 issue. In a note to the editor Maxwell has written: “Please understand it (the following article) as another venture in my attempt to free Indian opinion from its deluded obsession about the ‘Chinese aggression in 1962’.” —Editor] by NEVILLE MAXWELL The Chinese leadership was slow to recognise the seriousness of the problems presented to it by the Nehru Government’s border policy. Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, its government had recognised border settlement as a problem involving all its numerous neighbours, and had evolved a strategy to deal with it: forswearing irredentist attempts to regain “lost lands”, the People’s Republic of China would accept the border alignments with which history had left it, and negotiate where necessary to formalise and confirm them. In the case of India, this meant that India should retain the territory, up to what they called the McMahon Line, which the British imperialists had seized in their final expansionist foray. Zhou Enlai gave assurances to that effect in his several meetings and exchanges with Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s, and Beijing foresaw no territorial dispute with India. Their first inkling of troubles ahead came in 1958 when Beijing found itself accused of “aggression” (an extreme and loaded term in diplomatic parlance) when Indian border guards found a Tibetan/Chinese presence in small tracts claimed by India in what became known as the middle sector of the border. Then an Indian patrol was detected and detained in Chinese-claimed-and-occupied territory in the western sector. And in August 1959 an armed clash at a point called Longju on the McMahon Line, in which an Indian border guard was reported killed, set off an outburst of public and official suspicion and anger against China, not only in India but in the West generally and, critically, in Moscow. So in October that year the Chinese leadership found itself being reprimanded over the Longju incident by the visiting Nikita Khrushchev.1 “Why did you have to kill people on your border with India?” he demanded to know. Mao Zedung replied, defensively, “They attacked us first, crossed the border and continued firing for twelve hours.” Khrushchev retorted, “Nobody was killed among the Chinese, only among the Indians.” Zhou Enlai came in: “What are we supposed to do if they attack us first? We cannot [just] fire in the air! The Indians even crossed the McMahon Line. Besides, very soon Vice-President Radha-krishnan is coming to China—that shows that we are undertaking measures to resolve the issues peacefully by negotiations.” Mao summed up the Chinese position: “The border conflict with India is only a marginal issue, not a clash between the two governments. Nehru himself is not aware of what happened [at Longju]. As we found out, their patrols crossed the McMahon Line. We learned about it much later, after the incident took place. All this was known neither to Nehru nor even to our military district in Tibet. When Nehru learned that their patrols had crossed the McMahon Line he issued orders for them to withdraw. We also worked towards peaceful restoration of the issue.” Zhou continued with those reassurances: “You will see for yourselves later that the McMahon Line with India will be maintained and the border conflict will end.” Mao underlined that prediction: “The border issue with India will be decided through negotiations.” So it can be seen that at that stage the Chinese had failed to grasp the truth behind the border friction and beneath the careful wording in the Indian Government’s diplomatic communications. Nehru had decided, irrevocably as it turned out, that India would never agree to negotiate its borders. And the Longju clash was not accidental but reflected the Indian approach to borders that was later to be named, from the British imperial vocabulary, the “forward policy”, involving here the unilateral amendment of McMahon’s alignment in accordance with Indian convenience. India was treating the territory it claimed as ipso facto (by reason of that claim) Indian territory. The far more serious clash in October 1959 at the Kongka Pass on the Kashmir/Xiangkiang border, with killed on both sides, had a galvanic effect on Indian public opinion and jolted the Chinese leadership into alarmed attention. Convening again to discuss the border with India, with Army commanders in attendance, they learned that at points all along the border Chinese guards were experiencing frequent challenges from Indian patrols, and were chafing at orders that denied them the right to “rebuff’ them. Mao, perhaps rankling still from Khrushchev’s dressing down and certainly recognising that further clashes resulting in Indian casualties would add to the international opprobrium on China, decided that only disengagement of the two sides’ forces would prevent them. He ordered a 20 kilometre withdrawal of Chinese guards all along the border, with a request to be made to India for reciprocation. That request was refused but the proposed withdrawal was implemented by the Chinese forces.2 Still, and for at least a year thereafter, the Chinese leadership failed to appreciate the severity of the problem with which India’s assertive and unyielding approach to the border dispute confronted them, apparently expecting that their repeated diplomatic calls for negotiation, and for agreed short-term measures to tranquillise the borders, would ultimately be accepted. • BY mid-1961, however, the newly named forward policy of using force, non-violently, to extrude the Chinese from the tracts of territory claimed by India, was beginning to bite in the western border sector. Indian patrols, conducted now by the Army rather than armed police, were challenging Chinese posts and probing for positions from which to dominate and sever their lines of communication. The unyielding granite in India’s diplomatic refusal to negotiate had been personally felt by Zhou in his abortive summit meeting with Nehru in April 1960. It now began to occur to the Chinese leadership that India might deliberately be making itself an enemy of China—and even be bent on provoking hostilities. While noting Nehru’s long-standing declarations of friendship towards China and apprecia-ting his support for their claims to UN representation, as Marxists the Chinese had always harboured a reserve of distrust of Nehru as a “national bourgeois” politician. As such he was unreliable, and might at any time, for domestic political reasons or to curry favour with China’s implacable counter-revolutionary foe, the USA, turn towards enmity. To the Chinese, that seemed to be the only possible explanation for India’s aggressive policy and Nehru’s bellicose utterances, since conflict with China could not be seen as being of benefit for India. Toward the end of 1961 a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC) was convened to consider the response to India’s forward probing. Mao, in the chair, compared those to chess moves. “What should we do?”, he asked. “We can also set out a few pawns…. If they then [stop advancing] that’s great. If they don’t, we’ll eat them up. Of course we can’t just blindly eat them. ‘Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans’ [as the saying goes]. We must pay attention to the situation.” Orders were issued for Chinese forces to reverse their previous unilateral withdrawal, and for road construction to forward areas all along the border to be accelerated. Mao took the “struggle with India” under his personal control, ordering that no shot be fired from the Chinese side without his prior approval. In March 1962 the CMC met again to reconsider the border situation. Indian troops were continuing to press forward in the Western sector, attempting to cut off Chinese posts and sometimes opening harassing fire upon them. On the diplomatic front India was meeting every Chinese appeal for a mutual military standstill and negotiations with demands for unilateral Chinese withdrawal from all territory claimed by India. It was decided there should be no retreat under Indian pressure. When Indian troops established positions threatening Chinese posts in the western sector, additional Chinese forces should simply use their great advantage in manoeuvrability and numbers to outflank and dominate them in turn. Thus the two sides would be confronting each other in interlocking, mutually threatening positions. Chinese forces would still be forbidden to fire without permission from the central political authority. Since India was rejecting China’s calls for peaceful coexistence, Mao quipped, it should be confronted with “armed coexistence”. The summer of 1962 saw only intensification of that situation. Beijing increased the minatory tone and heat of its diplomatic warnings and made its threats of counterforce more open. Delhi’s replies continued to be insouciant and intransigent, Nehru being confident in the assurances from his Intelligence chief and courtier Generals that the Chinese were bluffing and would never dare hit back at India. For their part too the Chinese were uncertain about India’s motives and ultimate intention. Could it really be true that India, so obviously weaker militarily and at every logistical and tactical disadvantage along the border, would press on to the point of war? Zhou Enlai directed Chen Yi, now Foreign Minister, to meet privately with the Indian Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, when they were in Geneva at an international conference, and sound him out about India’s real intentions. Chen reported that Menon had simply re-stated his government’s position: Beijing’s complaints were groundless since Indian troops were doing nothing more than advancing into their own territory; the international borders were clearly marked on India’s maps and were fixed and final—therefore there was nothing to negotiate. Menon’s tone was arrogant, Chen added. Zhou concluded, “It seems as though Nehru truly wants a war with us.” Meanwhile the forward policy had begun to be implemented in miniature in the North-East, with Indian forces advancing across the McMahon Line in such places as the Indians thought it necessary to correct McMahon’s cartographic deficiencies. Their reoccupation of Longju in May prompted Beijing to warn that it would not “stand idly by” under such provocation—only to see another Indian post established across the McMahon Line near the trijunction with Bhutan. The Indians named it Dhola post, But Mao was still not ready to admit that his policy of “armed coexistence” was failing to deter India. In July the CMC reasserted his orders: the Chinese Army must “absolutely not give ground, strive resolutely to avoid bloodshed, interlock [with Indian positions] in a zigzag pattern, and undertake a long period of armed coexistence”. That cautious patience was under-standable. China’s international position was parlous: the Americans were warring in Vietnam, Chiang Kai-shek was threatening to invade the mainland from Taiwan, the Soviet Union was turning hostile. All rational considerations pointed to avoidance of hostilities with India if possible. On September 8 the Chinese extended their tactic of “armed coexistence” to the recently established Dhola post north of the McMahon Line at its western extremity. An outnumbering force (about 60 troops) was ordered to invest the little Indian post, use threats to induce its withdrawal if possible, and anyway to block further advance. This move was likely to have been made by the sectoral command without consultation with Beijing since it did no more than implement the orders already in effect. • MISREADING that move as a deliberate incursion into Indian territory (although the Indian Government was aware, of course, that the threatened Indian post was well to the north of the map-marked McMahon Line), Nehru gave orders that the Chinese move must be repelled. The Indian Army was given orders to attack the Chinese troops threatening Dhola post and drive them off all the territory there claimed by India. Moreover Nehru publicly proclaimed his order as soon as he issued it, The Chinese would have recognised instantly that Nehru’s announced order meant a radical development in the Indian policy which they had been passively containing. Although the Chinese had begun to suffer casualties in clashes in the western sector there had been no Indian attacks on Chinese positions there; but now Nehru had declared that a determined attack in force was to be launched on Chinese troops—positioned on their own side of the McMahon Line. There was no doubt that any such attack could be thrown back, even wiped out. Controlling the high ground, the Chinese troops could swiftly fortify their position to make it impregnable. However, many troops India put into their attack the Chinese could effortlessly outnumber them. But would such a local victory do China any good? International public sympathy was with India, whose accusation that it was China which had embarked on a programme of aggressive expansion and was refusing to negotiate its territorial claims was almost universally accepted —“Standing truth on its head” as Beijing ruefully described it. A local Indian defeat, with many casualties suffered, would be taken as another demonstration of brutal Chinese aggressiveness; and the Indians, with plentiful American and British support, would only build up for a much stronger attack and a wider war. On October 3 Beijing sent its final diplomatic warning and plea for immediate, unconditional negotiations: India instantly rejected it. After listening to a situation report of intensifying skirmishing in the west and Indian troop concentrations around Dhola post Mao conceded: “It seems armed coexistence won’t work…. Nehru really wants to use force: he has always wanted to seize Aksai Chin [in the western sector] and Thagla Ridge [above Dhola post]. He thinks he can get anything he desires.” Like a war-horse hearing bugles, he reminisced: “We fought a war with old Chiang Kai-shek. We fought a war with Japan, and with America. With none of those did we fear. And in each case we won. Now the Indians want to fight a war with us. Naturally we don’t have to fear. We cannot give ground, once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province…. Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would be unfriendly—courtesy emphasises reciprocity”. Zhou Enlai followed up: “We don’t want a war with India. We have always striven to avoid war. We wanted India to be like Nepal, Burma or Mongolia, and solve [border] problems with us in a friendly fashion. But Nehru has closed all roads. This leaves us only with war. As I see it, to fight a bit would have advantages. It would make some people understand us better.” “Right,” Mao concluded: “If someone doesn’t attack me, I won’t attack him. If someone attacks me, I will certainly attack him!” Thus the Chinese leadership decided to take up India’s challenge to war. But how to fight and win that war? “What should be our method? What should the war look like?”, Mao asked at a subsequent meeting. What China needed was not a local victory but to inflict a defeat so crushing that India might be “knocked back to the negotiating table”, Mao said, or at least taught a lesson that might last thirty years. To that end, China must keep the initiative throughout, deciding when to terminate hostilities as well as when to open them. Crack troops of the People’s Liberation Army should be deployed, with orders to achieve swift victory regardless of casualties, keeping always within the disputed areas. When all Indian forces in the disputed areas had been destroyed a unilateral ceasefire would be declared and then PLA forces would withdraw from all territory occupied in the campaign. On October 18 an expanded Polit-Bureau meeting approved the PLA’s operational plans and set October 20 as the day for action. In terms of international law Beijing could argue that in the circumstances, with Nehru having declared his belligerent intentions and the Indian Army having, on October 10, made its first offensive move in the Dhola area and being steadily reinforced there, China was fully justified in acting in “anticipatory self-defence”. The Chinese campaign went precisely as planned. Mao had overestimated the prowess of the Indians when he warned the PLA to expect strong resistance from experienced Indian troops. In the event incompetent commanders on the Indian side, obeying politically motivated and tactically foolish directives from Delhi, quickly brought their own troops to defeat and rout. Having achieved total victory in a two-phase campaign Beijing declared its pre-planned ceasefire on November 21 and all Chinese forces withdrew a few weeks later.. The political aims of the “counterZ-attack in self-defence” were not fulfilled, however. There was no change in the Indian approach, and nearly 50 years later India still refuses to negotiate, while Mao’s expectation of a 30-year lull on the borders fell short by five years: in 1987 after a minor confrontation at Sumdurong Chu, not far from Dhola, India again moved troops across the McMahon Line in calculated challenge, and war was narrowly averted. Still today there is no agreed “line of actual control”, friction on the borders is constant, the danger of renewed conflict ever-present. India’s refusal to negotiate has left it isolated in this regard; every one of China’s other contiguous neighbours (except Bhutan) has amicably negotiated a boundary settlement. REFERENCES 1. The Minutes of that meeting are in Cold War International History Project, Vol. 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 264-267. 2. China’s government has been far more liberal than India’s in releasing documentation about the diplomatic and military events around 1962.. The account of the Chinese leadership’s thinking and comments here is drawn from John Garver “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, editors, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 86-130. The writer has drawn on this material previously in his fuller paper, “Forty Years of Folly: What Caused the Sino-Indian Border War and Why the Dispute is Unresolved” in Critical Asian Studies 35:I (2003), pp. 99-112. * * * * * * * * * * * *
India to equip with nuclear Sub
SUPPLY of Russian nuclear submarine to India is being expedited in order to further strengthen the naval arm of the Indian forces which should be a source of concern of Pakistan. Russian Navy Chief was quoted as saying on Friday that the submarine would be delivered by the end of this year. Augmentation of the capacity of the Navy is part of Indian hegemonistic ambitions to dominate the blue waters. The attack submarine which can go down to depth of 600 metres for about 100 days would cost around $ 900 million and reflects how much India was spending on hi-tech weapons from all sources not only for the Navy but to modernize all the three services. The question arises why it is doing so? Pakistan will have to analyze the entire Indian military and particularly the naval strength, allocate more resources and acquire proper defence capabilities to deter any attempt for the blockade of its sea lanes. But instead of appreciating the good work done by the Navy, a part of the Pakistani media day in and day out under various pretexts is in the process of eroding the image of armed forces advertently and inadvertently. After the PNS Mehran base incident, some elements started launching motivated, baseless and senseless accusations against Naval Chief Admiral Noman Bashir which in our view was a criminal and unpatriotic act against a highly professional and committed person who has done a lot for the modernisation of Pakistan Navy. Such propaganda and accusations can lead to demoralization of our naval commanders and sailors who brave the rough seas to secure our vital trade routes and maritime boundary. One latest example was bringing back of Pakistani crewmembers of Suez ship despite all the odds including dangerous maneuvering by an Indian naval ship. Pakistan Navy under the command of Admiral Noman Bashir is in the process of modernisation. He has managed to acquire three Chinese made F-22 Frigates and the 4th is being built at Karachi Shipyard to be ready in 2013. A Perry class frigate has been purchased from the US which has large radius of action making it a very suitable platform for sustained maritime operations away from home port. The Pak Navy successfully test fired a combination of Surface to Air (SAM) missiles in Sonmiani early this year to check its air defence capability against hi-tech aircraft & Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as well as to consolidate the defence of the country’s coastline. These are some of the achievements made public and we need to encourage Pakistan Navy instead of following the suicidal tendency of hurling baseless accusations.
Scandals taint revered Pakistan military
It's difficult to overstate the respect that Pakistan's military has enjoyed among its people. Since the nation's violent birth in 1947, the armed services have been touted as the glue holding the country together, having waged three wars with India, defended Pakistan's part of divided Kashmir, safeguarded the Islamic world's only known nuclear weaponry and battled growing domestic terrorist attacks. In recent weeks, however, the military and its shadowy spymaster cousin, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, termed "the establishment" here, have been rocked by charges of incompetency, corruption, abuse of power and extrajudicial killings. "I'm 37 and in my lifetime I never imagined the Pakistani army and the ISI would be bludgeoned in public like this," said Mazur Zaidi, a documentary filmmaker. "The narrative they built up over 63 years is cracking." If the challenge to that narrative — that the military and intelligence services are above reproach — is sustained, it could have broad implications for Pakistan's democracy, regional relations and the fight against on terrorism, some analysts said. By dominating Pakistan's domestic politics, national budget and foreign affairs, the military establishment has hampered development of a more representative government, placed undue priority on facing down India and gobbled up resources better spent on education, electricity and the economy, critics said. Opening a national debate would strengthen the country's fragile democracy and could route more money toward jobs and training, arguably undercutting the attraction of extremism and ultimately strengthen Pakistan's defense by creating a tighter, more focused armed forces. "It's no secret the relationship between civilian and military authorities has been warped, twisted and skewed," said Tariq Fatemi, a former ambassador to the United States with close links to politician Nawaz Sharif, who has led a recent campaign for greater military accountability. Others said that this is no time to constrain the military, given enormous challenges at home and abroad. Whether the unprecedented public questioning of late marks the beginning of significant structural change or, as some believe, a blip before the military reasserts its grip remains to be seen. "Will this materialize into something more significant?" said Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent security analyst and columnist. "That's the million-dollar question." The catalyst for the recent pummeling was the U.S. raid that killed Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on May 2, which put the armed services in a no-win position. Either some military officials knew and sheltered Bin Laden for five years near a military base, or nobody knew, suggesting incompetence. And how could Pakistan's protectors fail to notice U.S. helicopters flying deep into its territory and not respond to the 40-minute operation? Three weeks later, six militants held a Karachi naval base hostage for 17 hours, most likely with inside help, killing 10 security personnel, wounding 15 and destroying two $100-million aircraft. This was followed by the abduction and killing of investigative reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad, who had detailed links between the navy and Islamist militants. Many believe the ISI, which long fostered militant groups to counter India, was involved in the killing; an anonymous ISI official told local news media that reports of its involvement were "baseless allegations." Then, TV video aired across Pakistan showed paramilitary troops shooting a Karachi teenager and then denying him medical help as he bled to death. The paramilitary alleged that the victim was armed — in the video he's seen begging for mercy with no weapon visible — but human rights groups say even this wouldn't justify summary judgment. "In Pakistani streets and living rooms, the military is excoriated as never before for its hubris, corruption and incompetence," said an editorial last month in the Daily Star newspaper. The missteps have sparked parliamentary questioning, critical news coverage and the campaign led by politician Sharif. Repeated attempts to reach military representatives were unsuccessful or referred elsewhere. Analysts said the establishment's crisis management efforts have faltered, in part because it's not used to open challenges. Rather than address critics, it has sought to intimidate them, some said.