Custom Search Engine - Scans Selected News Sites


Wednesday, 14 September 2011

From Today's Papers - 14 Sep 2011





Making of India's military leaders's Abhishek Mande and Hitesh Harisinghani are at the National Defence Academy's Camp Rover.  On the first day of a camp that tests the true mettle of NDA cadets, Abhishek accompanied the NDA's India squadron for a night-long trek.  When last heard, Abhishek spoke like a cadet on the move.  It is about 1.30 am on a Monday and I am walking on a footroad not more than 9 inches wide.  On any other Monday, I would probably be fast asleep under a warm blanket in the cosy comfort of my home in suburban Mumbai.  Today however I am with 23 cadets of the National Defence Academy's (NDA) India squadron trekking to reach a check post at Point 995 -- a peak about 900 m above sea level.  The weather gods have smiled upon us. There is thick fog -- the only thing visible is the silhouette of the person ahead of you -- but mercifuly it isn't raining very heavily. And since it is only a partially cloudy night, the path visible enough to walk on.  We are walking slowly in a single file. At one point, someone at the beginning of the file shouts out something that sounds like 'Be careful ahead'.  The cadet ahead of me is warned, looks around and tells me exactly what I don't want to hear -- "Whatever you do," he tells me, "Do not look on your left."  I do.  And I freeze.

Despite the fog, I know I am staring at a gorge that must be easily over 800 feet deep if not more.  At this point three thoughts go through my head:  "Crap. I'm scr**ed"  "What the hell was I thinking when I volunteered for this?" and  "Someone should have stopped me from doing this, like physically."  Then I take a deep breath and keep walking. There was no turning back now.  We move some 20 metres when the same voice shouts out: "Turn back. Now!"  As it turns out we were on the wrong path.  So we begin tracing our steps back.  Cadet K K Patil who is ahead of me now is rattling out instructions every seven steps. He gives me what will perhaps be the most useful advice of the evening. "If you're holding on to the grass, grab closest to the roots."

About seven minutes later, the advice comes handy. My foot slips but I find myself holding on to the absolute bottom of the 12-inch long wild grass growing along the slopes.  As we walk along, I say something in Marathi -- Patil's and my mother tongue -- the connotations of which only a native Marathi-speaking person can understad: 'Patil, sambhalun ghe re baba' ("Patil, take care of me, brother").  Patil laughs out loud assuring me that he'd be there for me. When we rest for a few minutes I realise he has a lot of questions to ask:  "Where are you from?"  "What newspaper do you write for?"  And perhaps the most poignant of them all:  "What are you doing here?"  I assure him he will have his answers the next day.  The 23 cadets of the India Squardon of the NDA and I are being led by Ankur Sharma, a bright young major of the Indian Army. He is about 28. The cadets are about 19. That makes me, 29, the oldest in the group.  Sharma is also an NDA alumnus and not very long ago, he too, like the cadets with us, had gone through the same drill before graduating in December 2004.

Tonight's exercise is part of Camp Rover, the Academy's bi-annual camp for the fourth term cadets. (The relatively easier Camp Greenhorn is for second term cadets while Camp Torna for the final term students is said to be more of an instructional camp).  Rover, or Rovers, as it is sometimes called, is said to be the toughest camp in its age category. For five long days, the cadets are put through intense exercises where their skill and spirit are put to test.  Day after each passing day, the exercises get tougher and the sleep deprived cadets -- they are given hardly any time to sleep in these five days -- reach the ultimate threshold of their endurance.  Today is the first day of the camp. Earlier, the 330 or so cadets have trekked some 6-odd kms to reach an interim camp where they take a break before they begin what is called the 'Night Walk' a 9-hour trek to the main campsite guided by nothing other than a compass and a map.  The Night Walk, I am told, is the easiest of the exercises that will follow. It is also the first all-night exercise where the cadets do not have the assistance of a GPS. So the chances of losing their way, as it happened with us, is very, very high.  Although there are officers with the squardons, who know the way and have a GPS with them, they do not help the map readers. The cadets have to make their way on their own.

Major Ankur Sharma comes from Himachal Pradesh. He is a first-generation armyman who was posted at Kupwara before arriving at the NDA a few years ago as an instructor. Sharma comes across as being an easy going person. He does not raise his voice but when he has to make his point, he does so with the ease of a diplomat. You might be sitting right next to him and think he's talking casually with a cadet till you see the young fellow suddenly go down on his hands and start doing push ups because he's done something wrong.  All the same, Major Sharma has a way of inspiring his boys. His experience in the Valley has taught him that the greatest success does not come without a motivated team.  Sharma often acts as the squardon's guide and voice of reason.  "Don't lose your heads," he keeps reminding them every once in a while.  A little after our great misadventure along the footroad, we reach a point where a particular corner baffles everyone. The rains and the 200-odd cadets who have crossed the very same path have made the ground slippery.  Everyone is trying to climb this one particular steep spot without much success. Two cadets have tried to go forth but have slipped almost seven feet down.  Sharma who is somewhere in the middle of the file takes the lead, climbs the steep slippery slope with seemingly no effort. Then he shouts out his words of wisdom: "Make your own path." And just like that he walks on.

The cadets figure their mistake. They avoid parts that their predecessors have taken and are now muddy and rather look for grassy portions to find foothold.  For some of us who are still struggling, he shouts out again, "Get on all fours."  By now we have crossed slushy fields, a couple of streams and mountains and a sleepy village with barking dogs. Tired, wet because of the off-and-on drizzle and exremely sleepy, we follow Sharma's instructions.  About 15 minutes later, we are walking on a relatively flat patch of road. The third check post of the night walk atop Point 995 doesn't seem to be very far away except that none of us can really see it.  "I think we are lost again!" Sharma says aloud and pulls up the map readers asking them to plot our location on the map. The two young boys flounder with the large piece of paper and mumble something.  Sharma hears them out patiently and continues walking.  "Are we really lost or are you calling their bluff?"  He smiles beatifically. "We're on track. I was testing them."

As we walk along Sharma tells me that this time of the night is crucial because everyone is really sleepy. If they're not kept on their feet they are bound to lose it. By the time it's 3 am, he says, they would have lost their sleep and be fresh.  Sometime later we finally reach the check post. Everyone drops to the ground. The squardon leader reports in to the two men at the check post.  Major Sharma saunters in and asks for the two map readers who'd misled the entire squardon. They are duly punished. While the rest of us are catching on our sleep, the two cadets are doing push-ups and sweating it out.  At about 5 am we reach a point where for the first time since we've left, we spot a tar road and a water bowser waiting for us. We still have two more check points to cross before we reach the main campsite.  The drizzling has not stopped but we have managed to cross the most difficult part of the trek.  Major Sharma who was with the map readers, breathing down their neck, is standing triumphantly on the street.  When I tell him I had never appreciated a tar road more in my life he laughs.

Then he turns to the cadets and takes their case. He tells them that they were running spectacularly behind schedule (which was true) and that he was allowing them to skip the fourth check post (this wasn't entirely true. The camp's commanding officer, Commander Peyush Pawsey had informed him that the road was getting too slippery to use. The cadets obviously had no business knowing this detail at the time).  We've been trekking for over eight hours. Despite the half dozen falls and some anxious moments, it has been a night to remember.  I have never trekked the entire night nor have I walked in such low visibility. I've never seen an entire stretch of a mountain below me covered in fog, nor have I seen the stars rise and set.  We walk along the tar road for a bit but I realise that my legs were now used to walking on slippery, uneven ground.  After some time, Major Sharma suggests we take a vehicle back to the campsite, a 10-minute drive. I am tempted to turn down the offer. I want to walk back with the rest of the squardon. But it has been a long night. So I give in.  I hoist myself on the extra high step of the army water bowser and crash on the seat. Sharma follows me and orders the driver, "Campsite chalo."

Taliban targets US embassy, NATO compound in Kabul

12 persons including 6 insurgents dead in multi-pronged attack  Kabul, September 13 Taliban suicide attackers with heavy weaponry today launched coordinated attacks in Kabul targeting NATO’s headquarters and the US embassy, killing at least six persons.  Around five hours after the attack began, gun-battles still raged. The Afghan government confirmed the deaths of four civilians and two policemen, plus at least six insurgents, with at least two militants still resisting after dusk.  Afghan officials said attackers were hunkered down in a multi-storey building under construction that overlooks the NATO headquarters and the US embassy, exchanging fire with security forces as two helicopters flew overhead.  Two separate suicide attackers also targeted the police in some of the most heavily protected parts of the capital, with the Taliban insurgency at its deadliest since US-led troops ousted the Islamists’ regime 10 years ago.  Any simultaneous attacks that succeeded in hitting NATO headquarters and the US embassy would be the Taliban’s most ambitious commando-style operation yet in their fight to evict the Kabul government and defeat Western troops.  In any case, the attacks dealt a humiliating blow to the Afghan government and NATO, underscoring worsening security in Kabul, where insurgents have staged increasingly brazen commando-style raids on Western and Afghan targets.  AFP reporters heard a string of loud blasts shortly after 1:30 pm (1430 IST) just two days after the United States marked the 10-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks that triggered the long war in Afghanistan.  The US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) works with diplomatic missions to prop up an Afghan government increasingly seen as corrupt. Its main headquarters is adjacent to the US embassy compound.  “The ISAF HQ is under attack at the moment,” a Western military official earlier confirmed as terrified residents and shopkeepers told how they dived for cover.  The US embassy, one of the largest American diplomatic missions in the world, one of the most heavily protected compounds in Afghanistan and home to hundreds of diplomats, confirmed only an attack “in the area”.  “There are no casualties at this time among embassy personnel,” added spokeswoman Kerri Hannan in an emailed statement, providing no further details.  An Afghan interior ministry official, speaking anonymously, said four policemen and two civilians were killed.  Officials said at least five civilians and three policemen were wounded. A journalist from Afghan state broadcaster RTA was shot and wounded during the standoff, an AFP reporter said.  “Security forces have reached the second and third floor (of the multi-storey building,” said police spokesman Hashmat Stanikzai.  “Two (of the attackers) are still resisting. We hope their resistance will end soon. They have almost run out of ammunition,” he added.  The ISAF confirmed it was providing “air support” although NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen had said he was confident that Afghan forces, who officially control security in Kabul, could deal with the assault. — AFP

Old equipment puts IAF ops, aircraft at risk

Vijay Mohan/TNS  Chandigarh, September 13 Despite having spent Rs 116 crore and considerable time, the Indian Air Force has been unable to meet its critical requirement of jam-resistant and secure air defence communication links.  Consequently, not only does the IAF continue to use obsolete and unreliable equipment that has led to aborted missions and potentially unsafe situations in the air and low aircraft availability, but also, this has raised the spectre of the network’s effective integration with the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).  Radio sets in service with the IAF for air defence communication links were scheduled to be phased out in 2004 and a project was initiated as far back as 1993 to develop airborne and ground-based secure radio/telephone sets. Christened INCOM, these were to be developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as per specifications laid down by Air Headquarters in 1987.  Though INCOM sets were meant for use in a hi-tech environment, Air Headquarters granted certain concessions in the specifications during the development stage itself in view of technological constraints. In 1997, IAF accepted INCOM sets worth Rs 71 crore from HAL.  Additional concessions were sought by HAL between 1999 and 2001. Evaluation trials, however, revealed poor performance and unreliability of the system with respect to range, inter-frequency interference, software and frequent breakdown in communication, according to the latest report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).  Despite being aware of these “unsatisfactory” trial results and the fact that the INCOM sets were expected to be used in a highly sophisticated environment in the future for data linking and communication with airborne warning systems, five more contracts worth Rs 45 crore were signed between 2003 and 2006 for installing INCOM sets on different aircraft fleets. Most of the sets were supplied by HAL between 2006 and 2010.  HAL was supposed to make good the technical concessions during development subsequently, but failed to do so. In 2008, it claimed it had reached the limit of its technological capability for further development.  “The performance and reliability of the sets was far below the requirements of the IAF. The contracted specifications in the area of frequency range, speech secrecy, anti-jamming etc, considered vital for flight safety of the combat fleet, have not been met,” CAG observed.

Anjali Gupta suicide: Group Captain held

Bhopal, September 13 Group Captain Amit Gupta of Indian Air Force was arrested here today in connection with the alleged suicide of former IAF Officer Anjali Gupta, police said. "Amit was arrested under Section 306 of the IPC (abetment to suicide) in connection with the suicide committed by Anjali at his residence here on September 11," Additional Superintendent of Police, Rajesh Chandel said.  "He will be produced in a court soon," the ASP said. Earlier today, the post-mortem report of Anjali Gupta, who was found hanging from the ceiling fan in the house of Amit, said she died of asphyxiation. Her family members alleged Anjali was in a live-in relationship with Amit and that continued even after she was court-martialled in 2006, the ASP said. — PTI

Woman officer's suicide can lead to negative profiling in IAF

It was after years of sustained pressure that women were allowed to be part of the Indian Air Force in a flying capacity. Anjali Gupta's suicide after her court martial can result in negative profiling of women, which could affect promotions.

FOR ANJALI Gupta, events took a turn for the worse in 2005 when she was stripped of her rank and finally dismissed from service. She, at 29, was the first woman flying officer to have been courtmartialled. The charges levelled against her were serious - pocketing state funds, disobedience, flinging food at a superior and having attitute not expected in a comissioned officer. Sometime after Anjai joined the IAF, she entered into a live-in relationship with Amit Gupta, a IAF Group Captain. Having not made any headway in her relationship with Amit, to convince him of leaving his wife and marrying her, Anjali finally comitted suicide by hanging herself from a ceiling fan - realizing that her live-in relationship had been in vain and so had her career.

The sum total of these events can be turned into a gender-specific argument, and may result in negative psychological profiling of women within the IAF. It only takes a small number of senior officers to term Anjali as 'weak', 'non-officer like', and 'prone to emotional swings'. All this attached with the stringent standards expected of a flying officer can adversely affect the morale and career progression of women officers - once superior officers start to think this way, and make their Annual Confidential Reports that assess a junior officer's performace.  The logic that the same set of circumstances or behavior can be exhibitted by a man may not hold ground with many officers in an establishment run by battle hardened men who don't want the added responsibility of filtering and screening a women's possible weaknesses when confronted with a do-or-die situation. After all, many men have known to have been insubordinate, running sweet little rackets for money on the side (especially those in AME Coprs), and having adulterous affairs. But if a woman is found guilty of this kind of behavior, then she's a threat and an enitity that weakens IAF's operational effectiveness. This kind of thinking existed before women in India were allowed to be part of IAF, that too in serious roles like flying. In initial years, GTOs, Group Task Officers, responsible for monitoring a candidate's performance during SSBs (Service Selection Boards), were often found oogling and losing concentration when women candidates carried out their assigned tasks in various tests. Thus, blaming women for men's behavior is a trap that the IAF should not fall into.  The core leadership at IAF, therefore, should ensure that no one indulges in negative profiling of women officers, and that ACRs are not besmirched with gender bias and that a woman officer's superior does not end up toeing the Commanding Officer's line to please his own superiors. It's all the more important for IAF to not to let Anjali's life story take negative root as there are hundreds of women officers presently serving in the IAF in all the branches of the IAF. Today, women can be posted either as a Pilot, a Navigator, or a Technical or a Ground Duty officer in any one of the Air Force bases. As women are as much a part of the IAF as men, unity in thought and perception should guide operational and strategic thinking when it comes to the critical weapon any Air Force in the world can possess - the people who man the infrastructure of the force - and not just the technologically dazzling aircrafts and military hardware.

Antony intervenes in IAF-Army rift over helicopters

NEW DELHI: The bitter turf war between the Army and IAF on the former's quest to acquire its own "mini-air force'' came to the fore once again on Tuesday, with defence minister A K Antony himself stepping in to hold that the two forces should reconcile their differences.  "Our armed forces need to adopt a holistic approach to security. No single wing of our security forces can work in isolation. The need for synergy and pooling in efforts and resources is being felt like never before,'' said Antony, speaking at the silver jubilee function of the Army Aviation Corps (AAC).  This comes in the backdrop of the 1.13-million strong Army keen to acquire its own attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in the years ahead, much to the dismay of IAF.  The Army holds that IAF does not fully understand concepts like "close air support'' for its troops on the battlefield, which incidentally led to arguments between the two forces during the 1999 Kargil conflict. IAF, in turn, contends the Army lacks "air mindedness'' to handle "scarce resources'' like "air assets".  Antony, on his part, said the Army and IAF must "ensure'' there is "perfect synergy'' between them. "Services will have to act in reconciliation amongst themselves so that India can have better and stronger armed forces... I will try to play a limited role in finding reconciliation,'' he said.  The AAC, incidentally, believes that it can perform "tactical roles'', while IAF will continue to have its "strategic role". As per plans, AAC wants to have a mix of reconnaissance, utility, tactical battle-support, armed and attack helicopters as well as tactical airlift fixed-wing aircraft in the long-term.

'Two Chinese helicopters entered India in August'

Two Chinese helicopters, along with seven to eight troopers on board, flew into Indian territory along the Line of actual Control (LAC) in Chumur area of Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir last month and damaged “unused bunkers” of India, before flying back undetected and

unchallenged.  This has been stated in a report sent by Leh district administration to the state government, highlighting the point that while the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) deployed in the area has sent the report of this incident to the ministry of home affairs, local administration was kept in dark, official sources told Hindustan Times.  Deputy Commissioner, Leh, T Angchuk, when contacted, confirmed that he has “sent a report (about the incident) to the state government, and also deputed sub divisional magistrate  and station house officer of Nyoma ( under the jurisdiction of whom Chumur area falls) to visit the

spot  to verify the facts and file a report.”  The Leh district administration came to know about this incident on September 9 and the SDM was deputed on a “fact finding mission” on September 11, sources in the state government told Hindustan Times.  They were awaiting for an on the spot report of the SDM and SHO.  But the Indian army denied that any such incident has taken place. “No incident like this has happened,” Northern Command spokesperson Lt. Col Rajesh Kalia told Hindustan Times when asked about the army’s version on the reported incident.  Official sources, however, maintained that the two choppers with seven to eight Chinese soldiers landed in Chumur area, about 200 to 300  feet inside the LC on August 25th. They were there for 20 to 25 minutes. They wrote something in Chinese and also damaged the “unused Indian bunkers.”  The details, how they damaged the bunkers, are not known.  The ITBP personnel, who were at a long distance, however, could not react because of the distance and they are reported to have watched the incident, with the help of binoculars.  The ITBP’s DIG based in Leh, according to sources, has sent the report to MHA.  Ladakh has a 646 km long LAC with China. The LAC remains undemarcated at several places.  The Indian army’s stated position, often articulated by the top commanders is that “these are not incursions but transgressions which take place because of the varying perceptions of LAC.”

A strategy to secure India

The recently set up Task Force with the mandate to review the national security system will achieve little unless there’s sweeping change and a new strategy.  Out of the blue, yet still welcome, the Government recently announced its first initiative in its seven years in power on national security. At first thought, it is a tinkering effort. The 14-member Task Force led by Mr Naresh Chandra has been mandated to review existing “processes, procedures and practices in the national security system and suggest measures for strengthening the national security apparatus including non-conventional areas having a bearing on the overall security situation”.  Devoid of a strategic defence and security review, the half-cock attempt will merely plug gaps, improve coordination and introduce best practices without enhancing the fundamentals of national security and providing a system which is more cost effective and delineates clear allocation of responsibility, authority and accountability. That can evolve only from a holistic strategic defence and security review  which has never been undertaken in India, nor ever a National Security Strategy Document, nor even a Defence White Paper, forget the non-traditional areas of security. Incidentally China has turned out seven Defence White Papers since 1998 and other security related guidelines.  The last comprehensive appraisal of national security was done in 2001 by a Group of Ministers following the Kargil Review Committee Report. It made several recommendations, many of them were implemented. It was only after the Mumbai terror attack in 2008 that internal security received a fresh scrutiny to spruce up homeland security. But we are nowhere near reaching optimal adequacy in the national security apparatus.  Our earlier reviews were entirely defence focussed and in the aftermath mainly of blunders in war. The 1962 defence re-equipment plan came in the wake of the humiliating defeat by the Chinese. There was no lesson-learning after the 1965 war, nor indeed from any others as Government has suppressed the official war histories.  In 1971, DP Dhar led the Apex One committee to sharpen defence preparedness. But its recommendations were stymied by the oil crisis of 1973. Later, Apex II was headed by PN Haksar which was instrumental in the preparation of the first Five-Year Defence Plan. In the mid-1980s Rajiv Gandhi had set up an informal interdisciplinary committee on defence and security. The fallout of India going nuclear was in a handwritten report given to him.  In 1990, the quintessential Arun Singh chaired the Committee on Defence Expenditure which went beyond cost-cutting and included higher defence management. After Mrs Indira Gandhi first mooted the appointment of a Chief of the Defence Staff in 1972, the Committee on Defence Expenditure strongly recommended its initiation and as a stop-gap arrangement, the creation of the post of a Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff for institutionalising jointness and integration among the three Services and with Government.  The 2001 Group of Ministers, tasked to review the national security system in its entirety, produced the most comprehensive report through four expert Task Forces on higher defence, intelligence, border management and internal security. It gave 340 recommendations and barring one on institutionalising the office of Chief of the Defence Staff, the remaining were accepted by the Cabinet Committee on Security. For instance, the establishment of the National Investigation Agency and the National Security Guard hubs in 2010 was one of the Group of Ministers’ recommendations which languished till Mumbai 26/11 happened.  There is clear recognition by the Government that threats to internal security surpass the challenges posed externally. Yet the Government’s investment in creating capacities falls abysmally short of articulated concerns.  India’s federal set-up makes States primary responders to quelling disturbances. Maoists and terrorists are armed with AK-47s and improvised explosive devices whereas many State police wield lathis and .303 rifles. China spends more money on internal security than external defence.  The post-Mumbai reforms have been confined to Maharashtra and the Centre. The Centre-State partnership to meet these challenges is on weak foundations.  The chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Mr K Shankar Bajpai, in a ringing indictment of the national security system has written that an inward-looking India which the world thinks is an emerging power is being asked to show leadership while decay in governance, dysfunctional state institutions and poor decision-making have retarded delivery. He mentions how badly defence preparedness has been hit by ineffective procurement procedures and strained civil- military relations.  Although the Task Force led by Mr Naresh Chandra is not comparable with the heavyweight Group of Ministers of 2001, at the very minimum it must recommend the institutionalisation of the post of Chief of the Defence Staff. In no country was there a consensus over this institution, but the Governments there had the political will to appoint one. For better integration between Government and the Services, and between the latter, a Chief of the Defence Staff is imperative. The military’s involvement and role in decision-making has to be institutionalised and civil-military relations made less tenuous.  Denying the Armed Forces appointments in the domain of national security is absurd. These have become reserved jobs for foreign and administrative services. Overall security is a combination of hard and soft power — defence, diplomacy and development. A retired General could not be accommodated as the Deputy National Security Adviser so he was inducted as Military Adviser to the National Security Council secretariat.  The despair among the military over its civilian stranglehold could blow up any day. Already service Chiefs are questioning the quality of governance as it impacts on national security. The new Task Force must recommend that Government provides clear political and strategic guidelines as well as timely matching resources to accomplish assigned missions. The recommendations of the Group of Ministers that are still pending should be implemented within specified time lines.  In 2001, the force and capability ratio vis-a-vis Pakistan for the Army was 1.8 to 1 and the Air Force 3.5 to 1. It has slumped dramatically to 1.2 to 1 and 1.6 to 1. As for the capability index against China, it is a joke. The latest Pentagon report has issued India a warning: Beware of Chinese build-up and strategic encirclement.  The Strike Corps envisaged to deter the Chinese which is still on paper was recommended in Gen K Sundarji’s Army Plan 2000 in 1987. If it is cleared this year it will not be operational for another five years, widening further the vulnerability gap.  We have inherited customs, traditions and habits from Britain, but there is one tradition we have failed to institutionalise — that of periodic security and defence review. We have become habituated to ad hocism. The British have given their military a clear and simple mission : To deter and defeat security threats as far from the homeland as possible.  India has made a habit of waking up after successive hits and humiliations. There was one more terrorist attack this month. The Task Force headed by Mr Naresh Chandra must reinvent the defence and security apparatus to ensure that India can stay on the trajectory of a high growth path.

Indian Army to give Lieutenant Colonel rank to Dhoni & Bindra

The Indian army recommended to give Lt. Colonel rank to Indian cricket team skipper M.S. Dhoni & Olympics gold medalist Abhinav Bindra. As a token of appreciation for their contributions to the Indian sports, the Indian army submitted the recommendation in front of the President of India on Tuesday. According to the sources, President Prathibha Patil accpted the same & Lieutenant Colonel rank will be awarded to Dhoni & Bindra soon.  Kapil Dev and Sachin Tendulkar got such honorary positions before, Sachin got Group Captain position in Air Force and kapil Dev got Lt. Colonel position in Territorial Army.


No comments:

Post a Comment


Mail your comments, suggestions and ideas to me

Template created by Rohit Agarwal