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Sunday, 30 October 2011

From Today's Papers - 30 Oct 2011

 

 

 

Post-Parliament attack, India deployed N-capable missiles on border’

Washington, October 29 India had deployed nuclear-capable missiles on its western border and refused to budge under US pressure to hold any talks with Pakistan after the 2001 attack on its Parliament by terrorists from across the border, says former top American diplomat Condoleezza Rice.  And what added to the tension in the White House's Situation Room in December 2001 was the sharp differences between the Pentagon and CIA about the ground realities in South Asia, she writes in her memoir 'No Higher Honor' that is set to hit the stands next week.  While CIA was informing White House that India was on its way to war, Pentagon was concluding it wasn’t the case, Rice, who then was National Security Adviser to President Bush, said.  In fact, Rice writes that CIA was speaking the language of Pakistan, which wanted the entire world to believe, in particular the US, that India was ready to attack them.  "The CIA believed that armed conflict was unavoidable because India had already decided to 'punish' Pakistan. That is likely the view that Islamabad held and wanted us to hold too.  "The fact is that after years of isolation from India, a country that had viewed the United States with suspicion for decades, the CIA was heavily reliant on Pakistani sources in 2001," Rice says in her book. During the eight years of the Bush administration, Rice served as both the National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.  "Looking at the same events unfolding on the ground, the Pentagon and CIA gave very different assessments of the likelihood of war," she said.  "The Defence Department, relying largely on reporting and analysis from Defence Intelligence Agency, viewed preparations as steps similar to those that any military (including our own) would take given the circumstances. In Pentagon's view, a build-up was not necessarily evidence of a formal decision to launch an attack," Rice writes. Rice said the President and National Security Council Principals were frustrated with ups and downs of the assessment over next three days. "Defence Department and CIA remained very far apart," she said.  As there was no let-up in the tension between the two neighbours, Rice said the US and Britain joined hands and organised a series of high-profile visits to the two countries with the view that there would be no war as long as some important dignitary was in the region. — PTI 

 

 

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20111030/main5.htm

     

Don’t revoke AFSPA in Kashmir: Advani

Thiruvananthapuram, Oct 29 Opposing the withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) from Jammu and Kashmir, BJP leader L K Advani today said nothing should be done that weakens the armed forces' position.  He, however, said there is a case for withdrawal of the Act in Manipur which could be examined.  "I don't think there is a need to withdraw the AFSPA so far as Jammu and Kashmir is concerned. Nothing should be done that weakens the armed forces position," he told reporters here.  Attacking Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Advani took strong objection to the position that coalition dharma often came in the way of acting strongly against corruption.  "Coalition dharma matters only in the matters of policy and not in the matters of integrity," he said.  Recalling how the BJP conducted the NDA alliance when it was in power, Advani said they had formed new states without any problems, but had deferred a decision on Telangana as it required a policy consensus among all the partners.  "My party was in favour of Telengana in the NDA, when in power. But our allies were not in favour," he said.  Advani also lamented that number of farmer suicides in the last eight years have been remarkably high.  The BJP leader also lashed out at the government for its failure to check inflation which has made even basic existence difficult.  He said suicides by farmers anywhere is unfortunate and urged the polity to ensure that they are not driven to take this extreme step.  Meanwhile in New Delhi, when asked to comment on Advani's statement that there is a case for withdrawal of AFSPA in Manipur which could be examined, BJP spokesperson Rajiv Pratap Rudy said, "Possibly on the basis of merit and ground realities, that can be accessed."  "We are not making an outright demand that it should be removed (from Manipur), but assessed," he said. — PTI

 

 

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20111030/nation.htm#6

     

India’s naval assertions

In 1962, as tension began to mount, with an increase in Chinese Army intrusions on the Indo-China border, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, before embarking on a flight abroad reportedly told the media that he had 'ordered the (ill-equipped and ill-prepared) Indian Army to throw the Chinese out'.  These famous last words led to independent India’s first and only disastrous military defeat. History now appears to be repeating itself.  In July 2011, a Chinese warship confronted an Indian navy ship Airavat shortly after it left a Vietnamese port in the South China Sea.  The unidentified Chinese warship demanded that INS Airavat, an amphibious assault ship, identify itself and explain its presence in what it said were Chinese waters, shortly after it completed a scheduled port call in Vietnam.  This incident indicates that Indo-China rivalry is now moving to the oceans, much earlier than anticipated.  India’s ministry of external affairs (MEA) has acted with unusual alacrity in two important areas — agreeing to train the Afghan Army, while also going ahead with the ONGC’s plan for oil exploration in the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, which China claims as its own waters.  The MEA and the ministry of defence (MoD) should have been advised by the Indian Navy on the inadequate force levels available to deal with the emerging scenarios in the Indian Ocean region and the Asia Pacific region.  The MEA and the MoD must be aware of the dozens of Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).  India has given repeated explanations that frequent Chinese air and land incursions are due to 'perceptional differences' over the contested LAC. This has further emboldened China, which respects only a combination of military, diplomatic and economic power.  In pure strategic terms there is nothing wrong with India “training the Afghan military” and also exploring for oil and minerals there. But it should first ensure that the Indian Army gets the money to buy critically needed artillery guns, improve border roads and induct additional troops needed to man the Indo-China LAC.  Similarly, on the maritime front, there is nothing wrong with the ONGC Videsh Ltd, exploring for oil in the South China Sea, or 'mandating' the Indian Navy to provide security to the island nations of the Indian Ocean region provided the Indian Navy gets the additional forces.  Even the powerful US Navy has been treading with caution in the Asia Pacific region, given China’s huge deployable air and sea power.  What will India do if the ONGC exploratory rig is 'blown up' by an unexplained explosion in the South China Sea in a repeat of the 2010 'Cheonan' incident, where a North Korean submarine sank a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea, but nothing could be done despite 'available proof'?  To put things in perspective, the Indian Navy currently has sufficient forces to tackle piracy, counter maritime terror and meet its coastal security needs.  To provide a sustained 'credible' presence by a single aircraft carrier battle group in the Asia Pacific Region, the Indian Navy will need to create a dedicated “APR Maritime Task Force” and a “logistics base” in Vietnam.  Raising and equipping an 'APR Maritime Task Force' will need time and billions of dollars. The Indian Navy will need more capability in the Indian Ocean region to counter the inevitable sustained Chinese Navy presence by 2030. In simple terms, to meet its 'emerging tasks' the Indian Navy will need to double its size and quadruple its existing annual budget.  While aircraft carriers are definitely needed in some scenarios, some other interim, 'cost effective' options need to be put on the table, or else India will go bankrupt in trying to meet its new strategic challenges.  These measures include exporting MTCR compliant Brahmos (290-km range) anti-ship cruise missiles and Prithvi-2 (250-km range) ballastic land attack missiles to Vietnam, South Korea and possibly Taiwan.  The Navy’s aging and depleting conventional submarine force, under prolonged 'benign neglect' needs to be bolstered by ordering a second conventional submarine indigenous production line under the much-delayed Project 75(I).  Also, an additional four conventional submarines and four nuclear attack submarines need to be imported, so that at least one of them is on patrol in the Asia Pacific region and Indian Ocean region at any given time, to provide 'invisible' presence-cum-deterrence, without the need for a logistics base for warships and aircraft, given the long endurance of submarines.  This “invisible” submarine presence would avoid incidents at the South China Sea. These same submarines could also be used in wartime to interdict Chinese shipping using the Indian Ocean region choke points and complement the Indian aircraft-carrier battle groups.  Boosting India’s sea power is essential to meet the emerging challenges in the Indian Ocean region and Asia Pacific region.  Another innovative option would be to use some of our numerous island territories as 'unsinkable aircraft carriers' with the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force aircraft, coastal radars and coastal Brahmos anti-ship missile batteries.  Indian land and air power, too, needs a boost to deter any misadventures by our adversaries on our land borders.  Diplomatically, India is making the right moves with Vietnam, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Iran and other island nations. It must, however, avoid a strategic overreach, keeping in mind the prevailing military balance.  India needs to remember what Prussian king Fredrick the Great meant when he said: 'Diplomacy without military power is like music without instruments'.  Our policymakers could make a start by reading Kautilya’s 2000-year-old Arthashastra and investing wisely, and quietly, in strategic national defence, which will be an insurance against war.  The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam

 

 

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/editorial/op-ed/india%E2%80%99s-naval-assertions-592

     

The Express Tribune      Home     Pakistan     Business     World     Sports     Life & Style     Multimedia     Opinion     Magazine     Blogs     Jobs     Classifieds      Editorial     Letters  Alerts CULPRITS WILL BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE: INTERIOR MINISTER REHMAN MALIK 02:47 PST < > What the Pakistan Army should do

A recent All Parties Conference (APC) has formally handed over foreign-cum-Taliban policy to the army. What the political parties are after is one another’s scalp: their default position is plotting the downfall of elected governments. The Pakistan Army is now in a precarious position of either taking the country out of the terrorist mess or repeating past blunders. If it doesn’t want to fight the terrorists, then there can be two reasons why: it likes what the terrorists are doing; or it is certain it will lose fighting against them.  The APC wants Pakistan to talk to the terrorists from a position of weakness. The army is deceived by an apparent retreat in the stance of the Americans to think it can persuade the terrorists to become non-terrorists. This is not going to work. Other options are equally vague. Will it play the Chinese card? One analyst says: “China has crucial interests in the South China Sea; and building a navy to counter the US fleet is a full-time job. China will not want a confrontation with the US in a place where it has no natural advantage over the latter”. News is that China actually wants military bases inside Pakistan to counter terrorism seeping into its Xinjiang province.  What will the neighbours think of doing? “Iran will actually prefer a US presence that is predictable to the armed hordes controlled and paid for by its Sunni adversaries in the Middle East. India’s capacity to influence events in Afghanistan is very limited”. No one will accept a repeat of what Pakistan did in Afghanistan in tandem with the Mullah Omar government in the 1990s. Pakistan is the wrong state to consult if you want a peaceful Afghanistan unless, of course, the Pakistan Army has changed its thinking. There is no evidence of that change.  If it doesn’t want a ‘two-front’ situation it must find other non-military ways of defusing it. In all kinds of scenarios, the Pakistan Army is in need of international assistance against a highly penetrative terrorist ideology. The last thing it should do is fall for the populist trap of heroic isolation.  The Pakistan Army should let foreign policy go. One says it because all armies attach foreign policy to geopolitics and, therefore, disqualify themselves as arbiters. They tie a most changeable category to the most unchanging physical aspect of the country where they imagine they see permanent advantage. Geopolitically, India is a permanent enemy. Geopolitically, Pakistan’s median ‘transit territory’ status gives it permanent advantage. Nothing could be more wrong.  The military view of Pakistan’s geopolitical importance has been proved wrong by the failure of the theory of ‘strategic depth’ as a kind of corollary to our self-image as a geopolitical obstacle. As some textbooks recognise, the geopolitical view of international affairs is favoured by all armies because it is linked to geography and, therefore, is of fixed value. And it obviates the periodical rewriting of textbooks army officers read during training. The only geography that works, however, is the one based on the civilian view: Finland could exploit its ‘median’ location between the West and the Soviet Union during the Cold War while Pakistan uses it today to block India.  The civilian geopolitical advantage is a part of the war equation in South Asia. The military imagination is fixed on it as ‘one-time advantage’: it is wrong in thinking that once a trade route is given to India, Pakistan will lose its upper hand. The fact is that the advantage will start materialising only after the trade route becomes functional and billions of international dollars become committed to it.  Published in The Express Tribune, October 30th, 2011.

 

 

http://tribune.com.pk/story/284667/what-the-pakistan-army-should-do/

     

Pak India Forum launches drive to trace kith and kin of unsung WW 1 Indian heroes

AMRITSAR: The Pak India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy has initiated a drive to trace the grandchildren or the relatives of valiant soldiers who fought and died unsung in World War I in and around the town of Ipers in Belgium. The idea is to get their details and keep them in the museum.  This was declared at the memorial to Indian soldiers erected at In Flanders Field Museum, Ipers, "What can be a better tribute than establishing the identity of World War I heroes who had fought for the British Army in unknown lands, but their names have been lost in oblivion, " said state convener of Pak India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy AS Mahal while talking to TOI on Saturday after his return from Belgium.  About 700 Indian soldiers under the command of British Army had fought at Ipers between from 1914, of which only about 440 could return home, said Mahal. The memorial to the Indian soldiers didn't have the names of all those who had given supreme sacrifice during World War I, he said.  Mahal said: " Director of museum Dendoven Domnick has shown keen interest in receiving the details of Indian soldiers so that same could be established in the museum". At Ipers , many Indian soldiers died due to chemical weapon attack by Germany who released tons of gas against British troops, killing hundreds of soldiers, informed Mahal.  The forum , through its network in both India and Pakistan has appealed to the grandchildren, relatives, friends and NGOs to come up with the details of brave soldiers. "We will compile the list of these soldiers with details including place of birth, photographs etc and send it to the museum so that their details should also appear in the memorial to Indian soldiers," he said.

 

 

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chandigarh/Pak-India-Forum-launches-drive-to-trace-kith-and-kin-of-unsung-WW-1-Indian-heroes/articleshow/10536160.cms

     

Army foils infiltration bid along LoC in Rajouri

Army troops today foiled an infiltration bid along Line of Control (LoC) in Rajouri district of Jammu and Kashmir.  Troops guarding the borderline observed movement of three suspected militants who were trying to enter the Indian side in Chamba gap forward defence location in Laam belt around 0200 hours, a senior Army officer said.  Army immediately deployed its ambush parties which opened fire on the infiltrators, he said, adding that they were forced back to Pakistan side

 

 

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/army-foils-infiltration-bid-along-loc-in-rajouri/867156/

     

Infantry Day celebrated at Mhow

INDORE: Infantry School at Mhow celebrated Infantry Day on Friday. The day is celebrated to commemorate the landing of the first regiment of the Indian Army in Srinagar 64years ago to defend Kashmir.  Speaking on the occasion Lt Gen KJS Oberoi, commandant of Infantry School stressed on the tradition of Infantry soldiers to get associated with humanitarian relief in natural calamities and shouldering additional responsibilities in peace keeping mission to bring global peace on behalf of the United Nations.  Infantry operates in all types of terrain be it air, land, water, mountains, glaciated super high altitude area, desert, riverine etc. It is this trait which has earned it the coveted of 'Queen of the Battle', he said. 

 

 

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/indore/Infantry-Day-celebrated-at-Mhow/articleshow/10532336.cms

     

India Toying With Dangerous Cold Start War Doctrine – Analysis

By BrigGen (ret) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi  Indian Military ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ (CSD) surfaces occasionally in Indian and Pakistani media as an unexplored paradigm. The opinion makers enjoy Voltaire’s philosophy support across the board, that in the third millennium globalized world politics, has become synonymous to the ‘Controversy Theory’ which allows the scholars perceptional as well as approach variations while evaluating any concept, doctrine or theory.  CSD is very high-sounding concept with its corollary ambiguity and those not possessing deep insight to the operational methodology tend to bolster its psychological fall out on the Pakistani readership, which is the only significant gain so far for India. Wittingly or unwittingly, its interpretation through plethora of contemporary theories projects it like an intricate myth if not monster. At times, it virtually appears that the war would flash like a bolt that would mince Pakistan’s military retaliatory capability to the dust unless some big ‘ifs’ were not resolved by Pak Army. It is therefore pertinent to put the threat in real perspective that could otherwise haunt world peace. India  India  The roots of CSD like doctrine were nourished more by the unbridled euphoria of a maverick Indian Army Chief than by operational necessity. General Krishnaswamy Sundarrajan, besides being an architect of several brilliant episodes as well as reverses, was perceived by Indians to have carried a feather in his cap called Operation Brasstacks. Commencing in July 1986 as a war game, it developed into an ever-biggest exercise in Asia when air, artillery, armor and mechanized formations’ ‘blitzkrieg-like’ integrated deep offensive strategy was tested. The much-trumpeted exercise reached its crescendo in December 1986, employing three strike corps (I Corps-Mathura, II Corps-Ambala and XXI Corps-Bhopal) along Indo-Pak southeastern borders but to the misfortune of Indian Chief, Pakistan had shrewder military strategist, General Zia-ul-Haq who lie in wait to let Indian Chief put all his eggs in one basket, Rajasthan. Before he went with broad smile to launch cricket diplomacy in India, he ordered his Army reserves in the North to sally unobtrusively from army garrisons by the time Sundarji (Indian Chief’s short name) had achieved optimum assembly of forces comprising nine divisions excluding the holding corps, in Rajasthan. It was fantastic move by Pak Army and a masterpiece work of our ISI and military intelligence outfits. Soon in GHQ, heap of signal interception reports (sinrep) indicated that scramble back from Rajasthan to their original battle locations was ordered to all the Brasstacks forces immediately. When a formation complained of lack of transport, a sinrep indicated, it received prompt advice to use all mobility means, even obsolete like bull carts. Thus some of our young officers, referred to ‘Operation Brasstacks’ in light vein as ‘Operation Bull Carts’. Sundarji’s dream of his flashing saber like masterstroke to cut Pakistan into two halves simply crashed in the sand dunes that he had nurtured all along to eliminate status quo-like operational equation between India and Pakistan prevailing since 1947. Thanks to Rajiv Gandhi, Indian Prime Minister who rescued Sundarji by agreeing with Gen Zia-ul-Haq to de-escalate the conflict in February 1987. Later Sundarji candidly admitted his failure, saying, he had over reached with Brasstacks. Not many people know the severity of dilemma Indian Army intended to create in the region and the reverses it faced in the process.  Briefly, one would put here the heightened concern for lack of strategic equivalence between the forces system of the two countries to rest by maintaining that it cannot be achieved in number game, as Pak Army is in comfortable position without it in the face of our weak economy. Jonathan Marcus, a BBC defense correspondent had also observed in 2003, “In straight numerical terms of population, economic might, military manpower and equipment it is almost meaningless to speak about an India-Pakistan balance”. Nevertheless, through persistent sharp scrutiny of Indian Army doctrines that are ‘war-gamed’ by Pakistan without laxity ever and her expansion as well as modernization, Pak Army has taken some potent measures by regrouping, modernizing and at times resorting to modest new raising of forces level to keep adversary’s hostile designs in effective check. Strategic imbalance, for several reasons, would remain Pak Army’s perennial friend and we have to coexist with it. Pak Army has some spare arrows in the bow to act as force multipliers in the power game like our ever readiness to wage a war as a cherished duty, conventional or nuclear if it is thrust upon us and exploiting geo-strategic advantage that geography renders us. We are in position to deploy and employ our holding corps as well as reserves in a manner that achieves effective counter level, yet with remarkable economy of effort. Pak Army has overwhelming edge in time and space factor and hence expeditious assembly of forces and convenient readjustment of the forces posture is possible if a hypothesis unfolds, other than the one on which defensive/offensive maneuver is mounted. Thus, our strategic orientation remains superior, allowing us to operate on interior lines, an advantage that Indian army cannot even wish.  Instead, India has to maintain Eastern Command far away for Chinese and Bangladesh borders as well as Northern Command for Chinese border and Pakistan Northern Areas/Line of Control. Western, Southern and South Western Commands remain poised against international borders with Pakistan while Central Command is in the depth at Lucknow because it has to meet certain contingencies in different directions. On achieving credible nuclear deterrence, Pakistan stands compensated for Indian preponderance in the conventional forces ratio while the nuclear claw of our adversary has also been defanged that she would have been rattling on us every now and then. In fact, Sundarji’s venture of 1986-87, in all probability was driven by such hypothesis that Pakistan would resort to ‘diplomacy’ means only to de-escalate once haunted by the specter of Indian nuclear force projections and not confront India by mobilizing its holding or punch formations for war. Their hypothesis was way off the mark.  Despite such reverses, however, the flare for Concept of Simultaneity (targeting more than one objective at a time) and lightening strikes against deep objectives in a theatre and destruction of Pakistan Army lingered on among Sundarji’s subordinates. On the contrary, three years of evaluation of Sundarji’s finesse enabled Pak Army to further fine tune its offensive as well as defensive plans. Not content with it, General Mirza Aslam Beg, our Army Chief, kicked off yet another mega exercise, ‘Zarb-e-Momin’ (Stroke of a Believer) in 1989 in Central Punjab that the world rated as the beginning of Pakistan Army ‘glasnost’ ensuring that posture-balance was maintained to preempt any mischief from the adversary.  Foxland and Blueland wrestled for several weeks at the final stages of exercise with troops. Chief Control HQ at Sargodha, assisted by Blueland and Foxland Senior Controls, orchestrated the entire conduct, monitoring and evaluation. Three corps, two armoured brigades, two artillery divisions, an air defence division and the Pakistan Air Force participated….Fourteen new concepts were tested; many vital lessons were learnt.The events were covered by national and international media. Several international delegates, Asian as well as Western, visited and were briefed including the leaders of our, what Zbigniew Brzezinski also called them, the holy warriors. Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Prof Burhanudin Rabbani, Sibghatullah Mujadadi, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf and Mulvi Younis Khalis were prominent. Some observations, they made, were point black and dictated by their grip on war making strategy. Over all the visiting delegates appreciated, the conduct that was meticulous and agreed that Blueland maneuvers could blunt Foxland offensives. That was precisely the message Gen Beg had intended to convey across the border.  Indian Military hierarchy’s frustration with what Sundarji had left for them as a model doctrine, employing three strike corps in ‘blitzkrieg’ style, grew worse in the wake of ‘Operation Parakaram’ that trailed December 13, 2001 attack on Indian Parliament. Mobilization of Indian army was ordered on 18 December 2001 to maul Pakistan severely for its alleged involvement that India detected ‘marvelously’ in just about three days time. Other than a few leading powers, world was oblivious of the Indian ‘responsibility’ to spark off an inferno in the Subcontinent. However, assembly of Indian forces was sluggish and stretched over three weeks. In the mean time, President Musharraf played his cards by ordering formations to occupy battle locations. He also gave a ‘turn about’ address to the nation, renouncing ‘Jihadis’ to woo Western sympathies, particularly of US that could not afford to see Pakistan switch its forces from Western to its Eastern borders. Conflict was averted through international actors’ intervention. Thus, masked operational lacunas in Indian Army planning, surviving comfortably hitherto fore, came under sharp scrutiny. Walter Ladwig III of Oxford University clearly saw the flaws in Indian’s war making ambitions like loss of strategic surprise, large size of strike forces that forced a long gap between political decision and military action and finally denuding of holding corps of any offensive punch. Hence, it was imperative to evolve a doctrine that should over-ride such weaknesses of one of the largest standing armies in the word that had clung to defensive-defence strategy since partition. In other words, a dangerous conflict averted in 2001 led to pursuits that are more lethal in the realm of deceptive war making in all forms.  Indian Army Chief, General Padmanabhan unveiled CSD in April 2004. Could it be summed up as a novel and brilliant idea? Certainly not because it carried conspicuous Sundarji’s stamp with mix of Indian Army Chief’s astuteness who managed now to substitute Sundarji’s lightening ‘blitzkrieg-like’ deep offensives doctrine with sharp and crisp shallow multiple strikes called CSD, also claiming to knock out their own holding and offensive corps’ capability gaps. In other words, now Indian defensive corps could contribute as effectively as strike corps, at least hypothetically and the latter were to become known as Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). Media leaks suggested that initially Indian army would constitute eight IBGs and each would be a concentrate of firepower and mobility under lavish air umbrella, built upon division size armor or mechanized formation with ability to operate as groups or sub-groups executing independent operations within the Group’s area of operation. The destruction of Pakistan Army has been retained as most lucrative objective, employing tremendous firepower and state-of-art means of ground as well as aerial mobility that would interdict and destroy its reserves, comprising mechanized formations.  General Padmanabhan’s brand of CSD sounded fantastic, as did Sundarji’s blitzkrieg and concept of simultaneity during peacetime about a decade earlier. Once the military logisticians, assembly of forces experts and their Ordnance Corps would have sat together to formulate the inventories to equip the Army with Padmanabhan’s long indent for latest machines, weapons and munitions, finance organ of Indian Government would have shuddered. Commenting on CSD within a month of its unveiling in his May 2004, what he called, strategic paper, Dr. Subhash Kapila, almost had the rub with the vision that CSD could not be harnessed militarily as per the perceived scales and if proceeded with, it would amount to asking for moon. He wrote as an indirect admission, “The unveiling of a new war doctrine throws up a host of factors for discussion in terms of why a new war doctrine is required, what are the attendant factors in putting it into operation, the limiting factors that may come into play…”. Commenting three and half years later in December 2007, Dr. Subhash Kapila’s apprehensions further blossomed. He even argued to defer CSD until 2010 because, “India’s COLD START WAR DOCTRINE woven around the operational concept of offensive operations at the very outset of hostilities cannot proceed towards success on Indian Army undertaking military operations with incomplete military inventories…”. Hence, it says all to conclude that CSD is a concept on paper and may be nothing more than at experimental stage with old clattering machines. Conversely, maintaining vigilance about our adversary is the hallmark that our Army must observe. For our consumption, we have to underscore the need for meeting our adversary in the battlefield as if they are equipped right now to the needle details. Indian endeavor to fling strategic surprise on Pakistan as a pre-emption strategy must be checkmated by covert peacetime measures so that our forces instinctively remain out of their bite through ruses, well conceived by our military leadership even when the war balloon has not gone up yet.  One would not question Indian Army’s prerogative to equip its forces to any limit but a pertinent question comes up here. Why did General Padmanabhan switch to intense multiple shallow maneuvers concept? Obviously, the answer is that in the presence of nuclear strike capability with Pakistan Army, there has to be a limited war on the cards. In other words, the change of heart did not emanate from his vision but driven by a compulsion, forced on Indian army under the obtaining politico-military environments. Therefore, CSD has another inhibiting factor that Indian battle sweeps have to remain short of reaching nuclear retaliation threshold. Answer becomes a question again if one asks the proponents of CSD that when India initiates conflict under the label of limited war, how friendly India would remain with Pakistan to keep the war under ‘limited’ tag. Do the adversaries prescribe the counter measure levels to each other? What India marks as limited objectives, in Pakistan Army reckoning they might not be ‘limited’ category? Military will and intentions on two sides have to differ because they work against each other. Though Pakistan would never ever be nuclear button-happy-power but when destruction of our Army is envisaged by CSD, that is the center of gravity of our survival, how would Indian wizards ensure that Pakistan would desist from using nukes, particularly once Pakistan Army concept of operations hinges on offensive-defence strategy? About the nukes, Shireen Mazari says, “Pakistan’s nuclear escalation ladder has only ‘one rung’.” Thus, she seals the argument.  The proposition would remain dangerous when India intends resorting to such measures like CSD under the assumption that by subjecting Pakistan to retribution, it would desist from proxy war in Kashmir that Pakistan denies. Instead, Pakistan maintains that Indian state terrorism has pushed Kashmiris to the brink. The scholars, world over have labeled CSD as dangerous to execute on prefixed speculations based on tunnel vision. CSD also creates space of legitimacy for Pakistan to demand from India to rub off its intrusive footprints in Baluchistan, FATA, Pak-Afghan border areas and thus leverage for escalation of crisis is afforded to Pakistan to recover its internal stability. Indian military collaboration with Israel is also a cause of change in Indian overtone when she talks of military ventures or handles Kashmiri demonstrations in mode and severity parallel to Israeli handling of the Palestinians’ demonstrations. With Israel colluding with Indian military extensively, resentment against Israel has grown manifold in Pakistan though, it did not enjoy a favorable score since inception of state of Israel.  India has to realize that its stakes in regional peace are far greater than Pakistan and hence its unimpeded economic spiral would be a factor to force India to reach for reconciliation with Pakistan in an earnest manner. Seeking ‘peace’ through dialogues and negotiations fervently by both the powers is the ultimate option they would have to embrace but an early embrace would augur well for the regional as well as for the world peace. Powers that have the clout with India and Pakistan must facilitate the adversaries to reach at workable solution. International community is also encumbered with the responsibility to caution India to desist from such momentary madness of 18 December 2001 that could have far-reaching repercussions beyond remedy.  You have to see this analysis in the context of almost perennial hostile relations prevailing between India and Pakistan since independence from colonial rule in 1947. Britain gave up this rich colony to avert the replay of events that occurred to some other European powers while leaving their African colonies in blood of the natives and considerably bruised themselves. Britain left in haste, leaving many thorny territorial division issues between India and Pakistan unresolved, ‘Kashmir’ the major one. The state had predominantly Muslim population but a Hindu chieftain ruled it. There have been military conflicts of varying intensity between India and Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and 1971, the last being more devastating for Pakistan when Indian military also helped public revolt against Pakistan by launching full-fledged offensives and its eastern wing, erstwhile ‘East Pakistan’ was clipped that emerged as Bangladesh. Thus, the hostility simmers, forcing both the countries to maintain large standing armies as of operational necessity. India and Pakistan now possess nuclear weapons, which means looming war scenario, has an added dangerous dimension to it. Some major powers and the beneficiaries are happy with threatening status quo in Kashmir. The simmering hostility nourishes their national interests perhaps better than the resolved conflict would do. Hence, no effective arbitration has been attempted by any power or organization except UN in early years of their inception by adopting Resolutions 38(1948) and 47(1948), which recognized Kashmiris right to choose between India and Pakistan through a plebiscite. India concurred initially but later backtracked. Tragedy of the time is that the Subcontinent remains prone to a horrific nuclear conflagration, possibly at the cost of world peace.

 

 

http://www.eurasiareview.com/29102011-india-toying-with-dangerous-cold-start-war-doctrine-analysis/

     

 

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