http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140704/nation.htm#13
Army Chief holds talks with Chinese military
Beijing, July 3
Army Chief General
Bikram Singh today held talks with China's military top brass discussing a host
of issues, including maintenance of peace at the boundary, implementation of
the new border defence mechanism and maritime cooperation.
Singh, who is the
first Indian Army Chief to visit China in nine years, held a number of
meetings, starting with Chief of General Staff of People's Liberation Army
(PLA) General Fang Fenghui.
Singh held
wide-ranging talks with Fang, discussing increasing military to military
contacts, implementation of last year's Border Defence Cooperation Agreement
(BDCA) and stepping up high-level exchanges between the two militaries, Indian
officials said.
Singh exchanged
views with Feng on a wide range of issues, including the maintenance of peace
on the border, maritime cooperation, interactions between the armed forces and
issues relating to global security, the state-run Xinhua news agency reported.
This year is the "Year of Friendly Exchanges" between China and
India. — PTI
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140704/edit.htm#6
Why the discord
over a century-old accord
Dinesh Kumar
A century ago, on
July 3, 1914, an accord was purportedly reached between China, Tibet and then
British-ruled India, which continues to have a bearing on Sino-Indian relations
to this day. The Simla Convention, which started on October 13, 1913, and
concluded on July 3, 1914, was meant to define and demarcate the boundaries
between India and Outer Tibet and between China and Inner Tibet. The British
had then proposed the 'division' of Tibet into 'Inner' Tibet, which was to be
under Chinese control, and 'Outer' Tibet, which was to have a sovereign like
status. The accord, or agreement, as it is variously known, reached after
tripartite talks between the three, led to the creation of what is popularly
referred to as the McMahon Line in the north-east, which China has consistently
rejected.
A series of
political intrigues had both preceded and succeeded the holding of the
tripartite talks, which is important to know in order to understand the context
in which the convention was held. It goes back to the start of the 20th century
when the ‘Great Game’ was at play. Colonial Britain, with its vast empire in
the region, feared that Czarist Russia might be secretly planning to extend its
influence over the strategically located Tibet. Whether or not Russia had any
such plans in the region is a matter of much debate. But one of the factors
that had reportedly sparked off London’s suspicions was the Mongolian-Russian
monk Aquang Dorji’s (also referred to by the Russian name Dorzhiev) proximity
to the 13th Dalai Lama. His political influence led to the signing of a treaty
between Tibet and Mongolia in Ulan Bator (capital of Mongolia) in 1913, which
incidentally he had signed on behalf of Tibet under the Tibetan name of
Khen-chen Lobsang Ngawang.
But the process of
countering Russia had begun well before then. The British began involving China
in matters pertaining to Tibet. In 1904, it sent a military expedition headed
by Colonel Francis Younghusband to Lhasa from where the Dalai Lama temporarily
fled to Mongolia. The British managed to open up trade agencies at Gyangtse,
Yaltung and Gartok in Tibet, a long cherished desire of London. But the British
were unable to make a breakthrough with the Tibetan government in Lhasa which
consistently rebuffed all overtures. So in 1905 the British turned to the 9th
Panchen Lama in nearby Shigatse, considering that he had influence over a vast
area of Tibet bordering India.
With Lhasa
discouraging Britain’s moves, London decided to create an autonomous region in
that portion of Tibet owing allegiance to the Panchen Lama independent of Lhasa
with the purpose of securing India’s northern border. And so Captain O’Conner
went to Shigatse and extended an invitation on behalf of the British Indian
government to the Panchen Lama to visit India. But then a number of
rollercoaster events occurred in quick succession. The Panchen Lama visited
India in 1906 but did not get the expected attention. Reason: Lord Curzon had
been replaced by Lord Minto as Viceroy and suddenly London was no longer that
enthusiastic in promoting the Panchen Lama. Lhasa understandably took a dim
view of the Panchen Lama’s visit to British ruled India. This was not helped by
the fact that in 1911, during a visit of the Dalai Lama to India, the Chinese
took the step of bringing the Panchen Lama to Lhasa and putting him up at the
Norbulingka, the Dalai lama’s traditional summer residence.
Breaking point
Tensions were
building up and a breaking point was now fast approaching. In 1910, Chinese
General Chao Erh-feng forced his way into Lhasa, which resulted in the Dalai
Lama fleeing to India and spending over two years in Kalimpong. The following
year, in 1911, the rule of the Manchu imperial dynasty ended in China and was
replaced by the republican nationalists with Yuan Shih K’ai becoming the first
President of the Chinese republic.
Then came the
breaking point. In April 1912, Yuan Shih K’ai issued a proclamation making
Tibet a province of China. Uncomfortable with China as a neighbour of British
India, London told Peking (later renamed Beijing) that while it recognised
China’s suzerainty over Tibet, it did not recognise China’s right to intervene
in Tibet’s internal administration and keeping unlimited troops in Tibet.
Further, Britain threatened it would not accord recognition to the Chinese
republic and close all communication with Tibet via India unless China gave a
written acceptance of this position.
It was then that
China agreed to participate in what is known as the Simla Convention. Much to
its delight Tibet was invited to the tripartite talks with Arthur Henry
McMahon, foreign secretary of the British Indian government, as the chairman.
He was assisted by Charles Bell, Political Officer for Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet
who was then McMahon’s adviser on Tibetan affairs. China was represented by
Ivan Chen and was clearly uncomfortable at Tibet being invited as an equal
partner. Tibet was represented by Lonchen Shatra, a confidant of the Dalai
Lama.
On behalf of the
Dalai Lama, Lonchen Shatra had at first demanded that Tibet be given full
authority over both its internal and external affairs; that it would consult
the British Indian government only on a few important foreign affairs issues;
that only those Chinese running private businesses in Tibet would be allowed to
stay in Tibet; and that Dhartse-doh would be the Tibetan border in the east
with China. But all these demands were rejected.
It was on February
27, 1914, that McMahon proposed dividing Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet that
would serve as a buffer between India and China, just as Mongolia had been
divided to serve as a buffer between Russia and China. The proposal stipulated
that Lhasa would have full authority over ‘Outer Tibet’ while China would have
unlimited presence in ‘Inner Tibet’. Much later, after Communist China occupied
Tibet in 1959, it turned Outer Tibet into the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965
and subsequently merged portions of Inner Tibet into adjacent Chinese
provinces.
All three
representatives initialled the Simla Agreement comprising 11 Articles arising
from the convention in April 1914. But when the time came to sign the document,
Ivan Chen refused and walked out, leaving McMahon and Lonchen Shatra to sign.
Following the Chinese representative’s walkout, a declaration was added that
China would not be entitled to any rights and privileges as a suzerain power in
Tibet if it failed to sign or ratify the tripartite agreement. No Chinese
representative ever returned to sign the document.
One aftermath of
the agreement is that Tibet ceded Tawang and some other areas of what is now
Arunachal Pradesh to India. These areas continue to be claimed by China. The
implication for Tibet was more severe - a legally truncated territory
eventually usurped by China.
Clashing
convention
What is surprising
is that initially the British themselves had rejected the agreement reached at
the Simla Convention. The official treaty record, C.U. Aitchison’s ‘A
Collection of Treaties’, was published with a note stating that no binding
agreement had been reached at Simla. Apparently the agreement was deemed to be
incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention which was eventually
renounced by both Britain and Russia. Yet it was not until 1937 — 23 years
after the agreement was signed and 16 years after the Anglo-Russian Convention
had been renounced — that the Survey of India published a map showing the
McMahon Line to be the official boundary. In 1938, which was just nine years
before India got Independence, the British government finally published the
Simla Convention in Aitchison’s Treaties.
In October 2008,
which is 94 years after the signing of the 1914 Simla Agreement, the British
reversed their earlier continuous stand that China only held suzerainty over
Tibet by announcing that it recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Then
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband described the old position as an
anachronism originating in the geopolitics of the early 20th century. "We
have made clear to the Chinese Government, and publicly, that we do not support
Tibetan independence. Like every other EU member state, and the United States,
we regard Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China," he stated on
October 29, 2008, thereby bringing a closure to the very agreement for which
his predecessors had a century ago manoeuvred almost a century ago.
Ironically, it is
the signatories (India and Tibet) who have lost out. Soon after Independence,
India was quick to first recognise Mao’s take over of China in 1949 making it
the second country to do so after Myanmar. Soon after it accepted Tibet to be a
part of China. On the other hand a politically weakened Tibet in a
post-colonial world of modern realpolitik and with hardly a military force to
reckon with was run over by a mighty China which quickly and brutally put down
a massive Tibetan revolt against the Chinese in October 1950 leading the Dalai
Lama to forever flee to India. The initiator (Britain) has since left the
subcontinent and subsequently gone on to disown the convention, governed as it
is by its own foreign policy interests. As a result the boycotter (China),
which is among the world’s militarily and economically most powerful countries,
has so far prevailed. India’s choice lies between taking some radical steps in
an attempt to salvage the 1914 agreement or chart a pragmatic course and find a
middle way out to resolve the border dispute. Taking either route will be a
long drawn affair.
As it stands a
century later, the Simla Convention of 1914 is no more. Long live the Simla
Convention!
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-big-deal-about-the-armys-small-arms/article6174395.ece?homepage=true
The big deal about
the Army’s small arms
Shortly after
taking over as the Chief of Army Staff in May 2012, General Bikram Singh had
emphatically declared that upgrading the small arms profile of his force was
his foremost priority.
Two years later,
as Gen. Singh prepares to retire in end July, neither the 5.56mm close quarter
battle (CQB) carbines nor the multi-calibre assault rifles he promised are
anywhere in sight for the Army’s 359 infantry units and over 100 Special Forces
and counter-insurgency battalions, including the Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles.
The Army’s
prevailing operational reality is that it does not own a carbine as the
Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) ceased manufacture of all variants of the WWII 9mm
carbines, including ammunition, around 2010.
And, two years
later, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) finally endorsed the Army’s persistent
complaints regarding the inefficiency of the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO)-designed INdian Small Arms System (INSAS) 5.56x39mm assault
rifles. It agreed that they needed replacing.
The former Defence
Minister, A.K. Antony, was forced into admitting in Parliament in late 2012
that the INSAS rifles had been overtaken by “technological development” — a
euphemism for a poorly designed weapon system which the Army grudgingly began
employing in the late 1990s and, unceasingly, had complained about ever since.
Among largest arms
programmes
The Army’s
immediate requirement is for around 1,60,080 CQB carbines and over 2,20,000
assault rifles that it aims on meeting through a combination of imports and
licensed-manufacture by the OFB. Ultimately, the paramilitaries and special
commando units of respective State police forces too will employ either or both
weapon systems in what will possibly be one of the world’s largest small arms
programmes worth $7-$8 billion.
Gen. Singh’s
guarantees, however, remain delusional and, expectedly unaccountable. And, in
time-honoured Indian Army tradition, they will now be transferred to his
successor, the Army Chief-designate, Lieutenant Gen. Dalbir Singh Suhag, to
vindicate.
An optimistic time
frame in inking the import of 44,618 carbines, which have been undergoing an
unending series of trials since August 2012, is another 12-18 months away if
not beyond. The deadline to acquire assault rifles, trials for which are
scheduled to begin in August, is even longer — certainly not before 2016-17, if
not later.
Till then, the
Army faces a fait accompli of making do without carbines, a basic infantry
weapon. It will also have to make do with inefficient INSAS assault rifles,
another indispensable small arm for the force’s largest fighting arm.
Currently, three
overseas vendors are undergoing “confirmatory” trials at defence establishments
and weapon testing facilities in Dehradun, Kanpur, Mhow and Pune with their CQB
carbines. The November 2011 tender for CQB carbines also includes the import of
33.6 million rounds of ammunition.
Competing rivals
include Italy’s Baretta, fielding its ARX-160 model, Israel Weapon Industries
(IWI) with its Galil ACE carbine and the U.S. Colt featuring the M4. The U.S.
subsidiary of Swiss gunmaker Sig Sauer, which was originally part of the tender
with its 516 Patrol Rifle, has failed to turn up at the ongoing carbine trials.
Sig is under
investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on charges of
alleged corruption in potentially supplying its wares to the Indian
paramilitaries. Alleged arms dealer, Abhishek Verma and his Romanian wife, Anca
Neacsu — both are in Tihar jail — once represented Sig’s operations in India.
Inefficiencies
The carbine
trials, expected to conclude by mid-July, will be followed by a final report by
the Army, grading the vendors on the performance of their systems. Thereafter,
the MoD will open their respective commercial bids, submitted over two years
earlier and begin price negotiations with the lowest qualified bidder — or L1 —
before inking the deal.
According to
insiders associated with the project, this intricate process is almost certain
to be protracted, despite the inordinately high expectations of efficiency from
the Narendra Modi government. They believe the carbine contract is unlikely to
be sealed within the current financial year. However, once signed, weapon and
ammunition deliveries are to be concluded within 18 months alongside the transfer
of technology to the OFB to licence build the designated carbine.
In short, no Army
unit will be equipped with a carbine till well into 2016.
The saga of the
assault rifles is even starker.
A multi-service
internal review in 2012 of the INSAS assault rifles revealed that they were
made from four different kinds of metal, an amalgam almost guaranteed to impair
their functioning in the extreme climates of Siachen and Rajasthan.
Surprisingly, the
Indian Air Force was the most vociferous in castigating the DRDO over as many
as 53 operational inefficiencies in the rifle that the country’s prime weapons
development agency took nearly two decades to develop and at great cost.
Inexplicably, the
DRDO insisted on the OFB developing the SS-109 round, an extended variant of
the SS-109 NATO-standard cartridge for 5.56x39mm rifles aimed at achieving
marginally longer range, a capability unnecessary for such a weapon system.
This operational superfluity delayed the INSAS programme as it required the
import of specialised and expensive German machinery and necessitated the “stop
gap” import of millions of ammunition rounds from Israel.
The DRDO-designed
and OFB-built rifle also cost several times more than AK-47 assault rifles of
which around 100,000 were imported from Bulgaria in the early 1990s for less
than $100 each as an “interim” measure at a time when the Kashmiri insurgency
was its most virulent and Islamist militants better armed than Army troopers.
The MoD issued the
tender for 66,000 5.56mm multi-calibre assault rifles in November 2011 to 43
overseas vendors, five of who responded early the following year.
The competing
rifles, required to weigh no more than 3.6kg and to convert readily from
5.56x45mm to 7.62x39mm merely by switching the barrel and magazine for
employment in counter-insurgency or conventional roles, include the Czech
Republic’s CZ 805 BREN model, IWI’s ACE 1, Baretta’s ARX 160, Colt’s Combat
Rifle and Sig Sauer’s SG551. The latter’s participation, however, remains
uncertain. A transfer of technology to the OFB to locally build the selected
rifle is part of the tender.
Meanwhile, field
trials for the rifles are scheduled for early August, nearly 30 months after
bids were submitted, as that is the extended time period it surprisingly takes
the Army to conduct a paper evaluation of five systems.
But these too have
already run into easily avoidable problems.
On security
grounds, the rifle vendors are objecting to the Army’s choice of its firing
range at Kleeth in the Akhnoor sector hugging the Line of Control (LoC) as the
venue for the initial round of trials. A final decision on this is awaited.
Thereafter, other trials will follow in diverse weather conditions in Leh, Rajasthan
and high humidity areas, all regions where the assault rifles will eventually
be employed.
Transforming the
soldier
Acquiring these
modular, multi-calibre suite of small arms is just part of the Army’s
long-delayed Future-Infantry Soldier As a System (F-INSAS) programme envisaged
in 2005, but interminably delayed.
The F-INSAS aims
at deploying a fully networked infantry in varied terrain and in all-weather
conditions with enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitised battlefield.
It seeks to transform the infantry soldier into a self-contained fighting
machine to enable him to operate across the entire spectrum of war, including
nuclear and low intensity conflict, in a network-centric environment.
But senior
military officers concede this programme stands delayed by six to seven years
almost exclusively because of the Army’s inability in formulating qualitative
requirements (QR) to acquire many of these ambitious capabilities.
Even deciding on a
multi-purpose tool, akin to a Swiss knife, for example, has been delayed
despite trials in 2011 featuring European and American vendors. Officers
associated with F-INSAS said this, like other equipment acquisitions, was due
to the Army’s rigid procedures, inefficiencies and inability to take timely decisions.
The Army
continually blames the MoD for creating bureaucratic hurdles in its
modernisation efforts, but fails in acknowledging its own shortcomings in
drawing up realistic QRs, conducting timely trials and, above all,
realistically determining its operational needs and working towards them
economically.
Senior officers
privately concede that the “uniforms” are largely responsible for the lack of
modernisation, but manage to successfully deflect their own limitations
sideways onto the MoD.
Gen. Singh’s
tenure, like several other chiefs before him, exemplifies this. It is
highlighted by their collective inability to even incrementally upgrade the
Army’s war waging capacity be it night fighting capability for its armour
fleet, modern artillery, light utility and attack helicopters or infantry
combat vehicles, among others.
http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/chinese-army-media-cell-delegation-visits-india-114070301140_1.html
Chinese Army media
cell delegation visits India
A six-member
Chinese Army media cell delegation arrived here today on a three-day visit and
was briefed about the functioning of media in India.
"The
delegation led by Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng, Chief of Information Affairs
Bureau of the Ministry of National Defence of China, arrived here and got an
overview of the functioning of the Army-Media interface and the current media
environment prevalent in India," an Army release said.
The Chinese
delegation held meeting with Army's Additional Director General (Public
Information) Lt Gen Bobby Matthews and expressed hope that the association
would grow and prosper in the times ahead.
http://www.dnaindia.com/pune/report-this-is-how-a-con-man-disguised-as-an-ex-serviceman-cons-youths-wanting-to-join-the-indian-army-1999248
This is how a
con-man disguised as an Ex-serviceman cons youths wanting to join the Indian
Army
Pune: As many as
20 aspirant candidates, who were keen to join Indian Army, were conned to the
tune of Rs58.50 lakh by a person who projected himself as an ex-servicemen. The
person had promised jobs in defence establishments and took money from these
candidates.
The incident came
to light when Harshavardhan Bhosale (21), a resident of Sangli, lodged a
complaint with Khadki police station against Sandip Gurav, a resident of
Kolhapur. P D Patil inspector in-charge of Khadki police station said,
“Complainant is a graduate and is unemployed. He works on his father’s farm in
Sangli. For two years he is being trying to clear the civil exams but all his
attempts were unsuccessful. When he was looking for a job, he met Gurav through
a mutual friend who projected himself as an ex-serviceman. The meeting was held
in the army canteen in November 2013 and Gurav promised to give him job in
defence establishment. He demand Rs2.75 lakh to clear the exams without giving
medical and physical tests. Gurav later claimed that the work will be done if
he gets more candidates.”
He added,
“Complainant contacted other youngsters and collected Rs58.50 lakh from them.
Many aspirant candidates are from Kolhapur, Sangli and Solapur. He called
everyone in city and made them stay in a Shivajinagar lodge. Gurav collected
their documents and made them sign on the medical test papers and claimed that
he will give them an offer letter. Later the youths got an offer letter with
govt logo along with Army motto, which mentioned that they have to be present
in Pune based defence training center on July 2. When the candidates reached
the center, they found that the letter was forged.”
http://www.firstpost.com/india/sunanda-pushkars-autopsy-from-army-to-aiims-why-promotions-are-controversial-1599905.html
From Army to
AIIMS, why promotions are controversial
What is common
among Dr Sudhir Gupta, Lt Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag, Lt Gen Ravi Dastane, Vice
Admiral (Retd.) Shekhar Sinha and Lt Gen (Retd.) SK Sinha? Gupta is the current
Head of the Department of Forensic Sciences at AIIMS in New Delhi, while the
others hail from a military background. But they're all on one list because
each was mired in controversy around their promotion to high offices.
Take the latest
case of Sudhir Gupta. The professor of Forensic Sciences has shot off a letter
on 26 June to the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC) alleging that he was under pressure to toe the line of the
higher-ups on the autopsy report of Sunanda Pushkar. Pushkar, the wife of
former Union minister Shashi Tharoor, died mysteriously at a five-star hotel in
New Delhi on 17 January this year. The doctor alleged that since he did not
buckle under pressure from the former Union health minister Ghulam Nabi Azad to
make changes in the autopsy report, a process was initiated to see him out as
head of the department.
Gupta was appointed
HoD of the forensic sciences department in 2013, bypassing OP Murthy who could
not qualify at that time. However, soon after the new director took charge,
"Dr Murthy’s disqualification was ignored at AIIMS's general body meeting
to pave way for his (Dr Murthy’s) elevation as the HoD." The forensic
department head blamed Azad for using his position to force him out because he
had insisted upon giving a professional assessment on the causes of Pushkar's
death.
The truth to these
allegations will come out once the CAT and CVC pass their order.
The common thread
between Gupta's case and those of the aforementioned others is the deadly mix
of dirty office politics, unsolicited political intervention, mudslinging in
the open and a scar on the institution.
Whether Gupta's
allegations are substantiated will emerge eventually, but he has shown the
institution in a bad light. This is true even more so of the Indian Army,
believed to be one India's best professional and disciplined units.
It is still
unclear if Lt Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag will become the next Army Chief on 31 July
this year pending a Supreme Court hearing on a petition filed by Lt Gen Ravi
Dastane. Although Union Defence Minister Arun Jaitley announced it in Rajya
Sabha that Suhag's appointment is final, there is no doubt that the SC will
have the final word.
Now Union minister
and former Army Chief Gen (Retd) VK Singh's ugly spat with the previous UPA
government on his age row had already given the army an image it would never
aspire to. The controversy surrounding Lt Gen Suhag only makes matters worse
and smacks of personal vendetta.
On 13 January last
year, the Delhi High Court quashed two promotions of Lt Gen SS Thakral, terming
them "illegal". He was relegated to the lower rank of Brigadier after
the court order.
"A bench of
Justices Gita Mittal and JR Midha quashed the promotions given to Lt Gen SS
Thakral, a 1974 batch officer, in 2009 and 2011 saying the Staff Selection
Board exercised its powers in “bad faith” and without following established
procedures"—a report in The Hindu said.
In 1983, former
Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Lt Gen (Retd) SK Sinha was denied elevation as
the Chief and his junior Lt Gen AS Vaidya, the then GOC-in-C Eastern Command
was appointed as General, thanks to a political intervention by the then Indira
Gandhi government.
It is
mind-boggling that despite clear guidelines on promotions, right from the
junior most to senior most staff, controversies related to appointments to
higher offices continue. For instance, the Department Of Personnel and Training
has its own Instructions and Guidelines on Seniority. A lot more data is
available online on recruitment and promotion rules of many Central
institutions including defence and academia.
These
controversies regarding promotional hierarchy not only drain resources, chew
away valuable time but also divert attention from critical issues.
It is ironic that
the judiciary is itself not out of this quagmire. The controversy surrounding
senior advocate Gopal Subramanium's withdrawal of candidature for appointment
as a Supreme Court judge is the latest example.
Unless
institutions are kept free of avoidable controversies like promotions at the
top, which should happen on prescribed norms, it will be foolish to expect
these institutions to deliver at their best.
No comments:
Post a Comment